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A Troubling Equation in Contracts
for Government Funded Scientific Research:
"Sensitive But Unclassified"= Secret But
Unconstitutional
Leslie Gielow Jacobs"
INTRODUCTJON

Breakthrough science can lead both to great good and to great evil. The
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon and the anthrax letter attacks that followed highlight the fact that
our enemies may use our own advanced science and technology against us. 1
When the dissemination of scientific information might jeopardize
national security, the federal government's primary response has always been
to try to control the spread of that information. In a variety of ways, the
government has long restricted public access to scientific information in the
government's possession. Since September 11, the government has further
tightened access to its own information, withholding from public view not
just classified data but also so-called "sensitive" information, the release of
which it says could pose a danger to national security.
Even with the new security precautions in place, however, the
government fears that it cannot keep the nation safe if it is able to control only
its own information. That is because some potentially dangerous scientific
information is produced by scientists at universities and in industry. Yet the
dissemination of privately funded, privately produced scientific information
is a form of private speech protected by the Constitution, and the
government's ability to restrict such speech, even when it might pose a danger
to national security, is limited. The government cannot "classify" or
otherwise prevent the sharing of such information without a court order, and

* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. Thanks
to Kristen Cerf and Erich Shiners for their excellent research assistance.
I.
See, e.g., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT Of THE NATIONAL
COM!viiSS!ON ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 1-46 (2004) (describing use
of airplanes as weapons of mass destruction); Rick Weiss & Susan Schmidt, Capitol Hill
Anthrax Matches Army's Stocks; 5 Labs Can Trace Spores to Ft. Detrick, WASH. PoST, Dec.
16, 200 I. at A I (genetic fingerprinting matches anthrax spores mailed to Capitol Hill with
those held by the U.S. Army).
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orders of this sort are available only in the most extreme circumstances. 2
Between the extremes of private and government information sits
information produced by private scientists with government funding.
Contract clauses that restrict the ability of funded scientists to disseminate
information related to government-sponsored research occupy an ambiguous
middle ground in constitutional doctrine.
Can the government restrict the flow of scientific information produced
with government funding in the same way that it can control its own
information, or do the constitutional limits that protect private speech apply?
This question has become increasingly urgent in the wake of the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001. Since that time, the government has sought
to expand the secrecy it imposes on funded private research beyond
"classified" information to include information that is merely "sensitive."
Although contract clauses that restrict the release of classified information are
an accepted part of the government/scientist research funding relationship,
clauses to protect "sensitive but unclassified" (SBU) information are new. 3
The SBU secrecy clause currently in widest use requires prior written
approval from the contracting agency before a scientist "release(sJ to anyone"
in any form SBU information "pertaining" to the research contract.~ The

2. Jn the Pentagon Papers case the Supreme Court declared. "Any system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Co urt bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity.'' N ew York Times Co. v. United States. 403 U.S. 7 13, 714 (1971)
(quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S . 58, 70 ( 1963)). Some privately ge nerated
information is required by the Atomic Energy Act to be kept secret. 42 U.S.C. §2274 (2000).
Such information is sometimes said to be "born classified.'' Yet even in a suit ro stop the
publication of this sort of material the governme nt would have to disc harge the "heavy burden
o f showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint." New York Times Co., 403 U.S.
at 714 (quoting Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 ( 197 1)). United
States v. The Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979), was just such a case. See

Symposium: Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Security, and a Free Press: Seminal
Issues as Viewed Through the Lens of The Progressive Case, 26 CARDOZO L. REv.
(forthcoming 2005 ).
3. More accurately, the SBU secrecy clauses are new for now. Scientists protested the
proposed usc of such clauses in the mid-1980s. See HAROLD C. RELYEA, SILENCING SCIENCE:
NATtONALSECURITYCONTROLS ANDSCIENTIFIC'COMMUNICATION 123 ( 1994) ("The presidents
of Stanford, Cal Tech, and MIT j ointly informed the White House in early April 1984 that their
universities would refuse to conduct certain kinds of sensitive. but unclassified, scientific
research for the Pentagon if DOD reviewers were given the power to restrict the publication of
findings.").
4 . J ULIE T. NORRIS. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN U:-;IVERSITIES/COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENT RELATIONS TASKFORCE, RESTRICTIONS ON RESEARCHA WARDS: TROUBLESOME CLAUSES
5-6 (n.d.) (quoting DFARS 252.204-7000 Disclosure of Information, which the institutions
surveyed reported was included in proposed contracts m ore often than any other single
restriction), available ar http://aau.edu/research/Rpt4.8.04.pdf. Use of the clause is prescribed
" [w]hen the Contractor will have <Jccess to or generate unclassified information that may be
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clause is aimed not only at information contained in a contract' s work product
that a scientist delivers to the government, however. It applies also to the
scientist's other publications and communications, which may include or refer
to work done with government funding, but which are separate and distinct
from the contract "deliverable." These "releases" may include scholarly
papers, conference presentations, email messages, and even telephone or
laboratory conversations. What constitutes SBU information is not well
understood, nor is it clear when particular information "pertains" to a research
contract. 5
It may be difficult for the government to enforce an SBU secrecy clause
across a broad range of communications, especially to prevent unauthorized
oral releases. Nevertheless, the mere threat of enforcement may be enough
to limit the flow of scientific information generally, as researchers are apt to
censor their own communications to avoid the difficulties and delay that
attend prepublication review. Moreover, uncertainty about what unclassified
information pertains to a contract, as well as the vagueness and breadth of the
term "sensitive but unclassified,"6 could enable contracting agencies to edit
proposed releases according to criteria that only roughly and perhaps
inconsistently relate to national security. In addition, the fact that scientific
information provides the grounding for policy choices in a range of politically
controversial areas heightens the possibility that agencies will use their broad
editorial discretion to bar releases that question agency competence or

sensitive and inappropriate." The clause provides:
(A) The Contractor shall not release to anyone outside the Contractor's organization
any unclassified information, regardless of medium (e.g., film, tape, document)
pertaining to any part of this contract or any program related to this contract, unless (1) The Contracting Officer has given prior written approval; or
(2) The information is otherwise in the public domain before the date of release.
(B) Requests for approval shall identify the specific information to be released, the
medium to be used, and the purpose of the release. The Contractor shall submit its
request to the Contracting Officer at least 45 days before the proposed date for
release ....
/d. at 5-6. The clause may found in the Defense Department's DEFENSEFEJJERALACQCJSfTIO:\
REGULATIONS SUPPLEMENT (DFARS), pt. 252, Solicitation Provisions and Contract Clauses
(rev. Nov .. l4, 2003), at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dfars/pdf/r2004!110/252204.pdf.
5. Research contract work often spans a number of years, and it may he carried out
concurrently with other research projects. The other research projects may deal with subject
matter similar to that of the government contrdCt,
scientists tend to work within their
specialties. That means that the source of particular information in a communication may be
difficult to discern.
6. This term appears not in the commonest secrecy clause, but elsewhere, to guide
agency censors. See infra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
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undermine official policy positions. 7
The SBU secrecy clause establishes a prepublication licensing system that
would, if applied directly to private scientific speech, face nearly insuperable
constitutional obstacles. 8 The question is whether government funding
fundamentally changes the constitutional analysis.
Part I provides a brief overview of ways that the government influences
the content and flow of scientific knowledge, including secrecy clauses
imposed on employees and contractors. Part II furnishes a background and
analysis of constitutional doctrine relevant to evaluation of the validity of
SBU secrecy clauses. This part examines general free speech doctrine with
respect to viewpoint discrimination and prior restraints, speech restrictions on
government employees, including classified information secrecy clauses, and
cases establishing the boundaries of access conditions on government
programs that restrict speech. It concludes that the current SBU secrecy
clause imposed on funded researchers impermissibly encroaches on free
speech. Part III suggests some minimum features of a constitutional system
of SB U information control.

7. The use of scientific informati on by the George W. Bush administration has been a
source of controversy. Compare SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIV., MINORITY STAf'F OF HOUSE
CO.\.IM. ON GOVERNME~T REFORM, 108TH CONG., POLITICS AND SCIENCE IN THE BUSH
AD\.IINISTRATfON (2003) (prepared for Rep. Henry A. Waxman, charging the Bush
administration with manipulating scientific committees, distorting scientific information, and
interfering with scientific research to benefit the President's supporters, including social
conservatives and industry groups), available at www.house.gov/reform/min/politicsands
cicnce/ pdf<;/pdf_politics_and_scicnce_rep.pdf; UNION OFCONCERNEDSC!ENTISTS, SCIENTIFIC
INTEGRITY IN POLICY MAKJNG: FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S
MISUSE OF SCIENCE 5 (July 2004) (criticizing the Administration's disregard of studies about
"the environmental impacts of mountaintop re moval mining,'' "censorship and distortion of
scientific analysis" concerning endangered species, "distortion of scientific knowledge" about
e mergency contraception, and " use of political litmus tests for scientific advisory panel
appointees"). available ut http://www. ucsusa.org/documents/Scientific_Integrity_in_Policy_
Making_July_2004.pdf, with Christopher Marquis, Bush Misuse~· Scientific Data, Report Says,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2003. at A 14 (quoting White House spokesperson Scott McClellan
responding to the Waxman report as follows: "This administration looks at the facts, and
reviews the best available science b ased on what's righl for the American people. The only one
who is playing politics about science is Congressman Waxman. His report is riddled with
distortion. inaccuracies, and omissions."); Statement of the Hon. John H . Marburger III on
Scientific Integrity in the Bush Administration, Apr. 2. 2004 (responding to the UCS
allegations. asserting that the Bush administration applies the "highest scientific standards in
decision-making"), available at http://www.ostp.gov/html/ucs/RespunsctuCongressonUCS
DocumentApril2004.pdf.
8. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) ("Any prior
restraint on expression comes to this Court with a ' heavy presumption' against its constitutional
validity.").
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THE CONTEXT OF THE SBU SECRECY CLAUSE

SB U secrecy clauses are only one small part of a larger mosaic of federal
government efforts to influence the creation and flow of scientific knowledge.
These efforts include the establishment of priorities for funding research,
regulation of research, and various forms of information control. They also
include an array of contract conditions on funded research.

A. Non-Contractual Efforts to Influence the Creation and
Flow of Scientific Knowledge
The government's spending priorities profoundly influence the growth of
scientific knowledge. The federal government is the largest funding source
for basic research in the United States.9 Much of the government-funded
basic research is conducted by college and university scientists. 10 A
substantial part of that research has always been defense-related. 11 The
terrorist attacks of September 11, 200 1, heightened the focus on national
security in federal research funding and diverted money from other research
efforts. 12
Government regulations also influence scientific research. New
restrictions address the threat ofbioterrorism by limiting work with identified

9. NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS - 2002 (2002), at
4-9, T able 4-1 , available at http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seind02/pdf/c04.pJf.
l 0. /d.; AMERICAN ASS'N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE, AAAS REPORT XXIX:
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FY 2005 (Mar. 2004), at Table 1-8, available at http://www.
aaas.org/spp/rd/05ptbi8.pdf.
11. NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, SCIENCE & ENGINEER ING INDICATORS- 2000 (2000), at
2-12, available at http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seindOO/pdfstart.htm.
12. See Be tsy Houston, Outlook Bleak for Science Budgets, WASH. NEWS, Apr. I , 2004
("While the administration proposes a $6 billion increase in federal R&D spending for 2005
over2004, virtually all the additional monies would go to weapons developme nt and homeland
security R&D.''), available at http://www.materialsocieties .org/3-04.htm: Paul Elias,
Bioterrorism Labs Sprout, and So Do Safety Concerns, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 30. 2004. at 15
("A growing number of scientists complain that the $6 billion earmarked by Congress for
fighting bioterro rism is excessive, is being doled out with little oversight, and is detracting from
efforts to combat problems that are much more deadly - for example AIDS and malaria, which
are already killing millions of people."); D ana Wilkie, Biodefense Squeezes US Science
Budgets, THE SCIENTIST, Mar. 15, 2004, at 52 ("The federal budgets for FY2004 and FY2005
reflect a fundamental shift in White House priorities when it co"mes to scientific research, one
that focuses on homeland security to the de triment of basic biomedical research for some of the
world' s deadliest diseases, critics say."), available at http://www.the-scientist.com/yr2004/
mar/prof3_040315.html; id. (quoting Wendy Selig, Vice President of Legislative Affairs for
the American Cancer Society: " We understand there' s not an infinite number of dollar~ here.
But if you're a cancer patie nt, you have to wonder if it was research that might have cured you
that ended up on the cutting room floor.'').
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dangerous or ··select" agents. They do this by requiring laboratories to
register in order to possess such agents and by tracking and limiting access to
them. 13 Other programs tighten the access of foreigners to select agents and,
more broadly, to biological research activities in the United States, 14 tracking
the activities of foreign students, including their areas of study, and entirely
prohibiting certain international students from receiving education and
training in sensitive areas. 15
The federal government also influences the growth of scientific
knowledge by restricting the release of government information. Two
executive orders currently establish a classification system for information
owned by the government or within its control, 16 categorizing information in
a hierarchy that defines its potential threat to the national security. 17 Many

13. See 42 C.F.R. §73.2(a) (2003) (implementing the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 by granting the Department of Health &
Human Services (HHS ) authority to regulate and prohibit the possession, use, receipt, or
transfer of "select agents or toxins" that "pose a severe threat to public health and safety"); 7
U.S.C. §8401 (Supp. II 2002) (authorizing the Department of Agriculture to regulate the
possession and use of "agents and toxins" that pose a threat to plant or animal health).
14. The Visas Condor program checks a visa applicant's name against a number of
government databases and denies visas to aliens suspected of having terrorist connections. See
Pederson & Freedman LLP. Security Clearances, Mar. 12, 2004 (describing details of
program). at http://www .usvisainfo.com/printer.php?dociD=97#condor. The State Department
has also created a Technology Alert List that identifies categories of specialized research
activities designated on a visa application that will provoke further intelligence review. Dep't
of State, Technology Alert List (9 FAM 40.31, Exhibit 1) (2000), available at http://www.foia.
state.gov/masterdocs/09fam/0940031 X l.pdf.
15. See Homeland Security Presidential Directive-2, Combating Terrorism Through
Immigration Policies. Oct. 29, 2001, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/newsl
releases/2001/10/20011030-2.html. In May 2002, the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy unveiled a proposal to create an Interagency Panel for Advanced Science
and Security (!PASS). !PASS would screen foreign graduate students, post-doctoral fellows,
and scientists who apply for visas to study "sensitive areas of science and technology that are
'uniquely available"' on U.S. campuses. NAFSA: Ass'n of Int'l Educators. Administration
Unveils Plan for Reviewing Foreign Students Pursuing Sensitive Areas of Study (n.d.), at
http://www.nafsa.org/contentl publicpolicy/NAFSAontheissues/OSTP_briefing.htm. The final
IPASS policy, which will be implemented by the Department of Homeland Security, is pending
as this is written. See Dep' t of Homeland Security Press Release, Remarks by Secretary Ridge
to the Association ofAmerican Universities. Apr. 14, 2003 (describing intended composition
and results of panel), at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=558.
16. Exec. Order No. 12,958, Classified National Security Information. 60 Fed. Reg.
19,825 (Apr. 20, 1995); Exec. Order No. 13,292, Further Amendment To Executive Order
12,958. as Amended, Classified National Security Information, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,3 15 (Mar. 25,
2003); see Nathan Brooks, Th e Protection of Classified lnjormatiall: The Legal Framework
(Cong. Res. Serv. No. RS21900) (2004), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RS21900.pdf.
17. See Exec. Order No. 12,958, §1.3 (detailing the different labels to be applied to
classified information).
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officials within various government agencies have authority to classify
information. Js The decision to classify is subject to periodic review, in order
to ensure that the criteria for classification continue to be satisfied. 19 The
Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), located within the National
Archives, oversees the compliance of all government agencies with the
classification standards. 20 An Interagency Security Classification Appeals
Panel decides appeals of classification challenges,21 which may be brought by,
inter alia, authorized holders of information who believe that its classification
is improper. 22 Nevertheless, the current system produces a substantial amount
of over- and underclassification. 23
The government's ability to control the release of its own information is
limited by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 24 which gives almost
anyone the right to request and receive government information without
providing a reason or demonstrating a particularized need for that
information. Classified information and eight other specific types of data,
however, are exempt from disclosure under FOIA. 25 Agency claims that
requested information is exempt because it is classified are subject to judicial
review. 26 Although an agency has the burden of justifying its withholding of
information, and while the judicial review is de novo and may involve in
camera inspection of disputed documents,27 this review is typically quite

18. See Exec. Order No. 13,292, § 1.3(a). Currently almost 4,000 government officials
may classify documents as top secret, secret, or confide ntial. See OMB Watch. Coalition
Reports Massive Classification Abuse, Secrecy Rose 60%. Sept. 7, 2004. at www.ombwatch.
org/article/articleview/2379/1/1/?TopiclD= 1().
19. See Exec. Order No. 13,292, §§1.5, 3.3, 3.4.
20. ld. §5.3(a), (b).
21. ld. §5.3(b)(l) - (3).
22. !d. § 1.8(a).
23. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SECRECY, S. DOC. No. 105-2, at xx.i (1997) t"The classification system ... is used too often to
deny the public an understanding of the policy making process. rather than for the necessary
protection of intelligence activities and other highly sensitive matters."): TSOO Reports a 25%
Rise in Classification Activity, SECRECY NEWS, Apr. 27, 2004 (citing an Information Security
Oversight Office report that " [m]any senior officials will candidly acknowledge that the
government classifies too much information, although oftentimes the observation is made with
respect to the activities of agencies other than their own"); JASON PROGRAM OFFICE, MITRE
CORP., HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION: BROADER ACCESS MODELS FOR REALIZING INFORMATION
DoMlNANCE (2004) (hereinafter HORIZONTAL l:-.!TEGRATION) (criticizing c urrent classification
system and noting, inter alia, that "[u)nderclassification of documents ... is a well known
practice.''), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/dasspol.pdf.
24. 5 U.S.C. §552 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
25. /d. §552(b).
26. Jd. §552(a)(4}(B).
27. /d.
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deferential. 28
The policy of the executive branch in responding to FOIA requests has
changed over time. While the Clinton administration announced that it
favored disclosure,29 the Bush administration has directed federal agencies to
evaluate FOIA requests carefully and to use existing exemptions liberally to
protect "sensitive" information. 30 The President's Chief of Staff has more
explicitly emphasized that agencies should "safeguard sensitive but
unclassified information related to America's homeland security" and give
"full and careful consideration to all applicable FOIA exemptions."31 The
term "sensitive but unclassified," however, has no single, clear definition. 32

28. Center for National Security Studies v. United States Dep' t of Justice, 331 F. 3d 918,
927 (D.C. Cir. 2003 ), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. I 041 (2004) ("the Supreme Court and this Court
have expressly recognized the propriety of deference to the executive in the context of FOIA
claims which implicate national security" (citing CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985), and other
cases)). But cf. Robert P. Deyling, Judicial Deference and De Novo Review in Litigation over
National Securiry Information Under the Freedom ofInformation Act. 37 VtLL. L. REV. 67, 6768 ( 1992) (arguing that while the "apparently prevailing view among scholars of the FOIA is
that courts must 'defer' to agency declarations regarding national security information ....
fj]udicial deference is not an accurate description of the role assigned to the courts in reviewing
FOIA national security cases.").
29. See Presidential Memorandum for Heads of Departments and Agencies Regarding
the FOIA, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1999 (Oct. 4, 1993), available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/foia/93_clntmem.htm (declaring that the Justice Department would defend a refusal to
release information pursuant to a FOIA request only if release would cause " foreseeable
harm").
30. See Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to Heads of All Federal
Departments and Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001) ("Any discretionary decision by your agency to
disclose information protected under the FOIA should be made only after full and deliberate
consideration of the institutional [national security and law enforcement], commercial, and
personal privacy interests that could be implicated by disclosure of the information."), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/011012.htm. The memorandum also states that the Justice
Department will defend a refusal to release information if the agency's decision has a "sound
legal basis." /d.
3 I. Memorandum from Andrew H. Card, Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff,
to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Mar. 19, 2002), available at http://www.
usdoj .gov/oip/foiapost/2002foiapost I O.htm.
32. See Library ofCongress, Laws and Regulations Governing the Protection ofSensitive
Bur Unclassified information (Sept. 2004), at i ("Although there is growing concern in the post
9/11 world that guidelines for the protection of SBU ... are needed, a uniform legal definition
or set of procedures applicable to all Federal government agencies does not now exist."),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/sbu. pdf; HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION, supra note 23,
at 9 ("The status of sensitive information outside of the present classification system is murkier
than ever. ... 'Sensitive but unclassified' data is increasingly defined by the eye of the
heholder."): Genevieve J. Knezo, ''Sensitive But Unclassified" and Other Federal Security
Controls on Sciemijic and Technical information: History and Current Controver~y (Cong.
Res. Serv. No. RL31 845) (2003), at 16-22 (cataloging federal agencies' various definitions of
'·sensitive but unclassified"). available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31845.pdf.
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Departments and agencies have attempted to implement the recent
executive directives in various ways. Thousands of documents that were
publicly available previously have now been removed from government Web
sites. 33 A number of agencies have also developed new policies to prevent the
release of particular types ofSB U information. 34 Additionally, the Homeland
Security Act directs the President to "identify and safeguard" within various
federal government agencies "homeland security information that is sensitive
but unclassified. " 35
Even without classifying data or invoking one of the FOIA exemptions,
as a practical matter the government enjoys broad discretion to keep

33. See, e.g., William Matthews, Walking a Fine Line on Web Access, FED. COMPUTER
WEEK, Feb. 4, 2002 (noting that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission completely shut down
its Web site in early October 2001 and is back online with information excised, while the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission "removed 'tens of thousands' of documents from the
Internet and from public reading rooms"), available at http://www.fcw.com/fcw/m1icles/
2002/0204/pol-access-02-04-02.asp; Patrice McDermott, Withhold and Control: lnfnrmatinn
in rhe Bush Administration, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. PoL' Y 671 .673 (2003) (observing that the
Department of Energy removed approximately 9,000 documents from its Information Bridge
Web service, and that the manager of the Defense Technical Information Center wa'> instructed
by national security officials to remove "thousands of documents from online public access");
see also OMB Watch, Results ofOMB Watch FOIA Request on Information Withheld. May 15,
2002 (listing information removed from federal agency Web sites after 9/11), at
http://www.ombwatch. org/article/articleview/735.
34. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. for example, announced a policy
change under which it will evaluate FOlA requests for "criticlll energy infrastructure
information" that "could be useful to a person planning an attack.'" and it will release such
information only to those who demonstrate a need to know. Critical Energy InfrasTructure
Information, 68 Fed. Reg. 9857 (Mar. 3, 2003) (codified at I R C.F.R. §§375.3 I 3, 388. I 12.
388.113 (2004)). Regulations of the Transportation Security Agency prohibit public disclosure
of"sensitive security information" that might be detrimental to transportation safety, including
research and development information. See 49 C.P.R. § 1520.5 (2003) (listing persons who
must protect Sensitive Security Information (SSI) fro m disclosure); 49 C.F.R. § 1520.7 (2003)
(defining SSI). The Department of Homeland Security recently issued regulations to
implement a statutory exemption from release under FOIA for "critical infrastructure
information" voluntarily submitted by industries or other non-federal entities. Procedures for
Handling Critical Infrastructure Information, 69 Fed. Reg. R074 (Feb. 28, 2004) (to be
codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 29). The U.S. Department of Agriculture restricts release of what it
terms "Sensitive Security Information," which is different from the SSI restricted by the
Transportation Security Agency. See USDA Departmental Reg. No. 3440-02, Control and
Protection of "Sensitive Security Information" (Jan. 30, 2003), t(Jvailable at http://www.
fas.org/sgp/othergo v/usda3440-02.html.
35. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. I 07-296, §892(a)(l )(8), 116 Stal.
2135, 2253; Justice Dept. 011 Critical h!frasrructure lnfn. SHSI, SECRECY NEWS. Mar. 2. 2004
(reporting that DHS procedures governing the handling of ·'sensitive ho meland security
information" are not yet complete, but, according to a Justice Department notice. "hold the
potential of significantly altering the landscape for the safeguarding of federal information").
at http://www .fas.org/sgplnews/secrecy/2004/03/030204.html.
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information secret that is within its control. Government agencies can gather
facts, conduct research, or produce reports without releasing them to the
public, unless compelled to do so under FOIA. 36 Agencies can subject
information to review and other bureaucratic requirements that delay release,
perhaps indefinitely. 37 They may edit scientific and other facts and
conclusions in reports in a fashion that serves the incumbent administration's
political agenda. 38 They also can choose to include or delete scientific
information, which in turn influences the content of the conclusions
presented. 39 Even when a statute requires an agency to convene a scientific
advisory panel before it makes important policy decisions, the agency can
influence the res ult through its selection or discharge of panel members. 40 In

36. See. e.g.. Elizabeth Shogrt!n, FDA Sat on Report Linking Suicide, Drugs, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 6, 2004, at A 13 (reporting that Food and Drug Administration decided not to rel ease a
report ~oncluding that children taking antidepressant drugs were twice as likely as those not
taking the drugs to exhibit suicide-rt!lated behavior); see also Senators Reintroduce CRS Bill,
AM. LIBRARIES, Apr. 1. 2003, at 15 (noting that the Congressional Research Service " is
prohibited from disseminating its work directly to the public.").
37. See. e.g. , Seymour M. Hersh, The Other War, NEW YORKER, Apr. 12, 2004, at 40
(claiming that a "Pentag on-commissioned report [was] left in bureaucratic limbo when its
conclusion s [about the conduct of the Afghanistan war) proved negative"); John J. Fialka,
Mercury Threat ro Children Rising. Says an Unreleased EPA Report, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20.
2003. at A I (reporting that EPA withheld a report on adverse health effects o f mercury
emis~ions for nint! months while the Bush administration tried to persuade Congress to pass the
Clear Skies Act, which would allow "emissions trading" between power plants).
38. See, e.g., Jennifer 8. Lee, White House Minimized the Risks of Mercury in Proposed
Rules. Scientists Say. N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7. 2004. at 16 ("While working with Environmental
Protection Agency officials to write regulations for coal-fired power plants over several recent
months, White Ho use staff members played down the toxic effects of mercury , hundreds of
pages of documents and e-mail messages show. " ); K atharine Q. Seelye & Jennifer 8. Lee, EPA
Calls U.S. Cleaner and Greener Than 30 Years Ago, N.Y. TIMES. June 24, 2003, at 28
(asserting that EPA report ''was heavily edited by the White Hou se . .. [and] eliminates
rt!fercnces to many studies that conclude that global warming is at least partly caused by human
acti vity ... and that global warming cou ld threaten health and ecosystems."); H. Jack Geiger,
Why fs HHS Obscuring a Health Care Gap ?, WASH. POST, January 27.2004. at Al7 (reporting
that the Department of Health and Human Services edited o ut references to race and ethnicity
in the Agency for Healthcare Re search and Quality 's national report card on disparities in
ht!althcare ).
39. See. e.g., Dana Milbank. White House Web Scrubbing: Offending Comments on Iraq
Disappear.from Site, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2003 , at AS ("The ft!deral Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention and US AID have removed or revised fact sheets on condoms, excising
information about their effectiveness in disease prevention, and promoting abstinence instead.
The National Cancer Institute. meanwhile, scrapped claims on its Web site that there was no
association between abortion and breast cancer. And the Justice Department recently redacted
criticism of the department in a consultant's report that had been posted on its Web site.").
40. See. e.g .. Mark Henderson, Science Panel "Pushes Bush Ethics," THE TIMES
(LONDON). Mar. 6. 2004. at 20:
An influential scientific panel that advises President Bush on bioethics has
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addition, government agencies exercise great discretion over scientific
information produced by others but presented by the government in
compilations such as brochures, booklets, and Web sites.
By contrast, the government's power to restrict the dissemination of
information not within its control is quite limited. Only a few statutes limit
the release of privately generated information on national security grounds.
These are the Invention Secrecy Act;H which restricts the release of
information contained in patent applications; the Atomic Energy Act,42 which
forbids the release of nuclear weapons information; and export statutes that
require individuals to obtain a license to transfer weapons-related products or
information to a foreign person.43 Otherwise, the government must obtain a
court order to prevent the release of dangerous information held by private
individuals, and to do that it must present a compelling demonstration of
danger to the national security. 44 Even without statutory authority, ho wever,
the government can sometimes induce changes in the flow of private
scientific information merely by threatening to impose restrictio ns. For
example, the editors of leading scientific journals recently agreed to
implement an internal review system after government officials expressed
concern that certain cutting-edge biological information could assist terrorists
in mounting an attack.45

B. Secrecy Clauses Restricting Private Speech
In addition to obtaining security clearances, government employees must
sign a nondisclosure agreement as a condition of access to classified

systematically distorted ev idence to advance a conservati ve ideological agenda, two
of its members said.. . . There is concern among scientists that Mr. Bush is stacking
advisory committees with religious and political allies. [Several panel members who
supported embryonic research] were dismissed from the panel last week and replaced
by a doctor who has called for a more prominent place for religion in public life, a
scientist who is an opponent of embryonic stem cell research, and an academic who
campaigns against abortion.
41. 35 u.s.c. §§181-188 (2000).
42. 42 U.S.C. §§20 11-2259 (2000).
43. See Arms Export Control Act. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751 -2799aa-2 (2000 & Supp. II 2002)
(weapons and military technology). The regulation of items with dual commercial and
weapons uses. formerly authorized by the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§240 12420 (2000) (expired), is now conducted pursuant to the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§1701-1707 (2000 & Supp. II 2002), as imple mented by executive
order. See Ex.ec. Order No. 13,222. Continuation ofExport Control Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg.
44,025 (Aug. 17, 2001 ).
44. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S . 713 (1971).
45. Journal Editors and Authors Group, Statement on Scientific Publication and Security,
SCIENCE, Feb. 21 , 2003, at 1149.
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information. 46 The agreement is a contract under which a cleared employee
agrees never to disclose classified information to an unauthorized person. 47
The contract binds the employee both during and after government
employment, so long as the information remains classified.48 The government
asserts that it may enforce the agreement by means of civil actions for a court
order enjoining disclosure of classified information, for damages, or for
disgorgement of any gains realized by the employee by an unauthorized
disclosure, and by means of administrative actions, including reprimand,
suspension, demotion, or removal, as well as loss of security clearance.49 It
also warns that it will criminally prosecute those who violate statutes
prohibiting unauthorized disclosures of classified information. 50
Some government agencies require some employees to sign classified
information nondisclosure agreements that include provisions calling for
prepublication review. 51 A broad range of writings is subject to the
prepublication review requirement, as are prepared oral statements. 52
Until recently, the government's nondisclosure and prepublication review
forms for federal personnel restricted disclosure of classified information
only. In August 2004, however, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
began requiring employees and others to execute nondisclosure agreements
to gain access to a range of unclassified information as well. 53 The DHS form

46. See Exec. Order No. 12,958, Classified National Security Information, §4.2(a), 60
Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 17, 1995).
47. See Classified blformation Nondisclosure Agreement (SF 312) (rev. Jan. 2000),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/isoo/new _sf312.pdf.
48. /d. <J[8.
49. See Information Security Oversight Office, Classified Information Nondisclosure
Agreement (Standard Form 312) Briefing Booklet (n.d.) [hereinafter CINA Briefing Book]. at
23. available at http://266fincom l.hqusareur.army.mil/Security_S2/Personnel%20Security/
Non_ Dis_lnfo_312.pdf.
50. /d. at 24.
5 1. See, e.g.. Sensitive Compartmented Information Nondisclosure Agreement (SF 4414)
(Feb. 1997). available at http://www.usgs.gov/usgs-manual/handboQk/hb/440-7-h/440-7h-figure 5-2. pdf.
52. See STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 994 (3d ed. 2002) (citing 28
C.F.R. 17.18(f), (g) (2001) (Dcp't of Justice guidelines); 57 Fed. Reg. 54,564\((e){l) ( 1992)
(proposed update of CIA Headq uarters Reg. 6-2)).
53. See A Non-Disclosure Agreement for UnclaHijied Information, SECRECY News,
Nov. 8. 2004 (describing categories of information subject to the agreements as including: "For
Official Usc Only (FOUO); Official Use Only (OUO); Sensitive Homeland Security
lnfonnation (SHSI): Limited Official Use (LOU); Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES);
Safeguarding Information (SGl); Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI); and any
other identifier used by other government agencies to categori ze information as sensiti ve but
unclassified." ).

*
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provided for a variety of penalties but did not require prepublication review.
The National Treasury Employees Union and the American Federation of
Government Employees asked DHS to rescind the non-disclosure agreement
policy, arguing that use of the agreement was unconstitutional. 55 The DHS
did so in January 2005, stating that nondisclosure agreements previously
signed by DHS employees "will no longer be valid.'' 56
Beyond its own employees, it is the government's established practice to
require each employee of a government contractor needing access to
classified information to obtain a security clearance and to execute a
nondisclosure agreement. 57 The agreement in question imposes the same
legal obligations undertaken by government employees, and the government
asserts the right to enforce these obligations by similar means, to the extent
possible, against both the individual employee and the employer.5B A primary
purpose of the agreement is to protect classified information released by the
government to private contractors during the course of funded research. 59 By
designating the research itself as classified, the government may protect the
products of that research as well by making them subject to the nondisclosure
agreement.
Although the government keeps Classified Information
Nondisclosure Agreements on file for fifty years,~ 0 the forms executed by
government contractors do not explicitly or implicitly require that contractors
submit future publications to the contracting agency for prepublication
review. 6 1
The SBU secrecy clauses currently being imposed on scientists
undertaking funded research stem from the executive branch's postSeptember 1J efforts to limit the release of SB U information it holds, as well
as from a continuing concern that such research may produce information that

54. See Dep't of Homeland Security, Non-Disclosure Af?reement (DHS Form 11 000-6)
(Aug. 2004), available ar http:f/www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/dhs-nda.pdf.
55. See Letter from Gregory O'Duden, Gen. Counsel, NTEU & Mark Roth, Gen. Counsel, AFGE to Joe D. Whitley, Gen. Counsel, Dcp'l of Homeland Security (Nov. 23. 2004)
(asserting that the agreement violated both the First and Fourteenth Amendments). available
at http://www .fas.org/sgp/news/::!004/11/nteu I 12304-gc. pdf.
56. Memorandum from Janet Hale, Under Sec. for Management, Dept. of Homeland Security to Undersecretaries et a!. (Jan. 12, 2005 ), available ar http://www.fas.org/sgp/other
gov/dhs20050 II J. pdf.
57. See CINA Briefing Book. supra note 49. at 12; see also 32 C.F.R. §2003.20 (2004)
(describing Classitied Information Nondisclosure Agreements SF 312, SF 189, and SF 189-A).
58. See CINA Briefing Book, supra note 49, at 23.
59. See 32 C.F.R. §2003.20(c) (requiring all "Government comractor. licensee. and
grantee employees'' to sign SF 312 "before being granted access to classified information.").
60. CINA Briefing Book, supra note 49, at 24.
61 . lcJ. at 22 (noting that individuals uncertain about the status of information in a proposed publication may seek voluntary review).
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could pose a national security danger in enemy hands. 62 The Department of
Defense first proposed that SBU secrecy clauses apply broadly as conditions
to its research contracts,63 but it has since withdrawn that proposal. 64 The
Bush administration has stated that it continues to adhere to the prior policy
of restricting the flow of information produced by government-funded
scientific research only when the project is designated classified at the
outset.65 In practice, however, agency officials increasingly are inserting SBU

62. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF
TERRORISM: CONFRONTfNG THE DUAL USE DILEMMA 17-23 (2004) (explaining the new threat
posed by advances in biotechnologies and genetic engineering technologies and recent
examples of''contentious research" in the life sciences); Nicholas Wade, A DNA Success Raises
Bioterror Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,2005, at A 17 (unexpected sudden advance in synthesis
of long DNA molecules could allow hioterrorists to create smallpox virus genome).
63. See Dept. of Defense Reg. No. 5200.39-R, Mandatory Procedures for Research and
Technology Protection Within the DOD (draft Mar. 2002), at 1[APl.AI.4, available at
www.fas.org/sgp/news/2002/04/dod5200_39r_dr.html; Conducting Research During the War
on Terrorism: Balancing Openness and Security, Hearing Charter for the House Comm. on
Science, 107th Cong. (2002) (noting that the proposed prepublication review "could have been
extended to unclassified studies involving basic research" and that ''criminal sanctions could
have been imposed against scientists violating the policy"), available at http://www.fas.
org/sgp/ congress/200211 01 002charter.html.
64. See American Association of University Professors Special Committee, Academic
Freedom and National Security in a Time of Crisis, 89 ACADEME 34, 42 (Nov.-Dec. 2003)
[hereinafter AAUP Special Committee Report] (describing how scientists "balked at the notion
of prior restraints on research rhat had not been classified as secret"), available at
http://www.aaup.org/statements/REPORTS/Post9-1l .pdf.
65. See generally National Security Decision Directive 189, National Policy on the
TramferofScientiflc, Technical and Engineering Information (Sept. 21, 1985) ("It is the policy
of this [Reagan] Administration that, to the maximum extent possible, the products of
fundamental research remain unrestricted. It is also the policy of this Administration that.
where the national security requires control, the mechanism for control of information
generated during federally-funded fundamental research in science, technology, and
engineering at colleges, universities. and laboratories is classification. Each federal government
agency is responsible for: a) determining whether classification is appropriate prior to the award
of a research grant. contract, or cooperative agreement and. if so, controlling the research
results through standard classification procedures; b) periodically reviewing all research grants.
contracts, or cooperative agreements for potential classification. No restrictions may be placed
upon the conduct or reporting of federally ~ funded fundamental research that has not received
national security classification, except as provided in applicable U.S. Statutes"), available at
http://www.fas. org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-189.htm; DANA A. SHEA, Balancing Scientific
Publication and National Security Concern~·: Issues for Congress (Cong. Res. Serv. RL3 1695)
(2004). at 7-9 (indicating that as of late 2004the 1985 directive ''has not been superceded and
continues to be the government policy regarding controls on federally-fundecl research
results''), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RL31695.pdf. With classified research
identified from the outset as secret, universities were able to choose whether to do classified
research, and they were able to segregate classified research from other work if they chose to
do it. See AAUP Special Committee Report, supra note 64, at 43 (making a "rough guess" that
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secrecy clauses into contracts for unclassified scientific research on an ad hoc
basis, while debates continue within the government about how to protect
SBU more systematically. 66
In its commonest form, the SBU secrecy clause applies when a researcher
"will have access to or generate unclassified information that may be sensitive
and inappropriate," and it prohibits a "release to anyone" in any form without
the funding agency's "prior written approval."67 There is no standard time
frame for agency decisionmaking or explicit provision for judicial review. 68
The remedies that the government could seek for violation of an SBU secrecy
clause are presumably similar to those for violation of Classified Information
Nondisclosure Agreements executed by contractors, and they include a court
order barring publication, money judgments, and disqualification from future
government projects, which may be imposed on the individual violator, the
employing institution, or both. 69
While the SBU secrecy clauses resemble information controls that the
government has long imposed on employees and contractors engaged in
classified research, some provisions of these clauses and the context in which
they are used make them constitutionally suspect. Three concerns in
particular bear careful examination.
First, the definition of SBU is broad, vague, and inconsistent across
government agencies. Whereas information may be classified only under the
definitions and procedures set out in the relevant executive order, no similar
structure cabins the discretion of agency officials to designate information as
SBU. This broad discretion raises the possibility of government censorship
of private speech according to viewpoint, and such censorship is the primary
danger addressed by the Free Speech Clause.

about "two dozen universities ... undertake classified work," either regularly or on a case-bycase basis, noting that several universities have stand-alone facilities for classified research,
such as the Massachuseus Institute of Technology's Lincoln Laboratory, the University of
California's Los Alamos National Scientific Laboratory, and Carnegie Mellon University's
Software Engineeri ng Institute, and reporting that while "the reasons for separation vary by
institution, ... a common premise i> that a stand-alone facility is easier to protect than an oncampus laboratory or building.").
66. See Peg Brickley, Contract Conflicts: U.S. Universities Resisting Government
Attempts to Control Fundamental Research, THE ScrENT!ST, Jan. 7, 2003 (observing that the
"rash of restrictive clauses appear[s) to be the scattershot product of security-conscious
administrators"), available at hup://www .biomedcentral.com/news/2Q030l 07 /02; OM8 Tackles
Sensitive But Unclassified lnfonnarion, SECRECY NEWS, Sept. 3. 2002 (OMB is to develop
standards and procedures for protecting SBU information), available at http://www.fas. org/
sgp/news/secrecy/2002/09/090302.html.
67. NORRIS, supra note 4, at 5-6 (quoting DFARS 252.204-7000).
68. Library of Congress, supra note 32, at i (no uniform set of procedures applicable to
SBU information).
69. CINA Briefing Book. supra note 49, at 32.
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Second, the SB U secrecy clause's prepublication review provision
imposes a prior restraint on private speech, which is the most disfavored
method of enforcing the government's secrecy interest. Although such a
review requirement may properly be imposed to prevent the release of
classified information by current or former government employees, there is
no precedent for extending it to restrict the release of unclassified information
obtained or produced by private parties in the course of working on
government contracts.
Finally, aside from uncertainty about the definition of SBU and the
requirement of prepublication review, the very idea of controlling SBU
information raises constitutional questions. Some threshold level of national
security danger must exist for the government's interest in secrecy to
outweigh the individual' s interest in speaking freely and the public's interest
in receiving the information. Classification signifies an official decision,
according to established criteria, that certain information poses a definite and
substantial threat to national security. Without such an official decision or
criteria for making it, the government may not be able to demonstrate the
requisite danger to national security that would overcome an individual's free
speech right.

II.

CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

Because a research contract applicant can always walk away from a
proffered government contract, one might imagine that the government could
attach any condition at all to such a contract. But that is not the law. 70 The
Constitution limits the conditions that the government may impose on receipt
of its many benefits, even though recipients are free to reject the benefits or
may, often, be quite willing to accept them with conditions. 71 The
Constitution protects not only individual recipients but also the public more
generally from the cumulative effect of government bargains that require the
exchange of individual rights.72 The public has a particular interest in the free

70. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr. 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) ("[Our] precedents
have lung since rejected Justice Holmes' fam ous dictum, that a policeman 'may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has not the constitutional right to be a policeman."'
(quoting McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216. 220 ( 1892))).
71. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc. , 539 U.S. 194,210 (2003) (the "government
'may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected ...
freedom of speech' even if he has no entitlement to that benefit" (quoting Umhehr, 518 U.S.
at 674)).
72. See Thomas W. Merrill. Th e Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: In the Conre.xt
of Property, 72 DENY. U. L. REv. 859, H62 (1995) (positing that ··when constitutional rights are
perceived by courts as having a large public goods dimension, cuuns will be reluctant to
enforce contracts in which individuals waive the exercise of the right in exchange for some
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speech right, which exists not just for speakers, but for listeners as well. 73
Sometimes the government may properly impose conditions on benefits
that limit the recipient's freedom of speech. Courts have found it difficult,
however, to draw the line between constitutional and so-called "unconstitutional" conditions. 74 On one side of the balance is the government' s
broad discretion to structure its own programs. On the other side is the risk
of government censorship of private speech that such broad discretion invites.
SBU secrecy clauses implicate both sides of this balance: the government
seeks to structure scientific research projects that it funds so as to prevent the
release of dangerous information, while researchers and the public want to
preserve the free flow of scientific information not owned by the government.
Several strains of constitutional doctrine are relevant to a determination
of the constitutionality of SBU secrecy clauses. First Amendment doctrine
relating to speech restrictions generally, and the law regarding prior restraints
in particular, demonstrate that the definitions and prepublication review
requirements of the SBU secrecy clause would violate the Constitution if
imposed without the lever of government funding. Another strain addresses
the constitutionality of speech conditions imposed on government employees
and contractors, including classified information nondisclosure and
prepublication review agreements. Yet another involves the constitutionality
of various speech-restricting conditions imposed by the government on
private parties seeking benefits other than government employment.

discretionary benefit.").
73. See United States v. Nat. Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 468 (1995)
(interests of "potential audiences" factor into the balance when the government restricts its
employees' speech); First Nat'! Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 ( 1978) ("A
commercial advertisement is constitutionally protected not so much because it pertains to the
seller' s business as because it furthers the societal interest in the 'free tlow of commercial
information."'); Johnson v. Fed. Express Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1276 (M.D. Ala. 2001)
("Free speech furthers intrinsic and instrumental values for speakers and listeners.'"); David
Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in GovernmentFunded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675,680 ( 1992) ("When the government funds speech ...
first amendment concerns arc not limited to potential coercion of the subsidized speaker, but
extend also, and perhaps more importantly, to the listener. From the perspective of the
audience, the danger lies not in the coercive effect of the benefit on speakers, but in the
indoctrinating effect of a monopolized marketplace of ideas.'').
74. As to unconstitutional conditions more generally, see Mit<!hell N. Berman, Coercion
Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (200 l )
("Regrettably, more than a century of judicial and scholarly attention to the problem [of
unconstitutional conditions] has produced few settled understandings."); Merrill, supra note
72, at 859 ("The Supreme Court has never offered a satisfactory rationale for [the
unconstitutional conditions] doctrine.''); Frederick Shauer, A Unifying Theory?. 72 DENY. U.
L. REV. 989, 990 ( 1995) (doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is "irredeemably intractable").
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A. National Security Speech Restrictions and
Prior Restraints Generally
A critical distinction exists in Free Speech Clause doctrine between
speech restrictions that are content-neutral and those that are content-based.
Content-based speech restrictions are "presumptively invalid,"75 because
when government targets the message of private speech it may skew the
marketplace of ideas,76 either to the advantage of majority over minority
points of view or to the incumbent government's political advantage. 77 To be
valid, content-based speech restrictions must survive strict judicial scrutiny,
pursuant to which the government must demonstrate a compelling purpose
and a means narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose. 78
Although viewpoint discrimination is the most egregious Free Speech
Clause violation,79 strict scrutiny is required for both content- and viewpointbased speech restrictions. 80 This is because content-based restrictions are
more likely than content-neutral restrictions to be viewpoint-based in

75. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul. 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
76. See id. at 430 (Stevens, J .. concurring) (''[Viewpoint discrimination] requires particular scrutiny, in part because such regulation often indicates a legislative effort to skew public
debate on an issue."); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819.
894 ( 1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he prohibition on viewpoint discrimination serves that
important purpose of the Free Speech Clause, which is to bar the government from skewing
pubic debate.").
77. See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 512 U.S.
622, 641 ( 1994) ("Government action that stifles speech on account of its message ... pose[s]
the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to
suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate through coercion
rather than persuasio n. These restrictions 'rais[e) the specter that the Government may
effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace."' (quoting Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116
( 1991 )).
78. See United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc .. 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
79. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 ("When the government targets not subject matter, but
particular viewpoints taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is
all the more blatant.").
80. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 735 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring) ("contentbased discriminations are subject to strict scrutiny because they place the weight of government
behind the disparagement or suppression of some messages, whether or not with the effect of
approving or promoting others"); id. at 723 ("Regulation of the subject matter of messages.
though not as obnoxious as viewpoint-based regulations, is also an objectionable form of
content-based regulation."); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm 'n, 447 U.S. 530,
537 ( 1980) ("The First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to
restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire
topic.").
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purpose81 or effect:82 they do not bear the political legitimacy of contentneutral speech restrictions, which spread their burdens broadly and without
respect to message.~ 3 Any speech restriction, on the other hand, must be
articulated precisely and narrowly to be valid. 84
Strict scrutiny is required for content-based speech restrictions even when
the content of that speech could endanger national security. In fact. the
Supreme Court developed the strict rules that now apply to such restrictions
in spite of government claims that it needed broad discretion to limit private
speech in order to protect national security and public order.xs The Free
Speech Clause, like other individual rights guarantees, prevents the
government from using the most efficient means to pursue its security

8 1. See, e.g.. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 56
( 1987) ("When a restriction is content- based, the risk of improper motivation [based on
disagreement with the ideas ex pressed] is especially high. for government offici aIs con sidcri ng
the adoption of such a restriction will o ften , consdously or unconsciously, be influenced by
their own opinions about the merits of the restricted speech." ).
82. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 431 ( 1992) (Stevens. J .. concurring) ("a
regulation that on its face regulates speech by subject matter may in some instances effectively
suppress particular viewpoints").
83. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 512 U.S. 622,
676 (1994) (O 'Connor, J., concuJTing in part and dissenting in part) ("Laws that treat all
speakers equally are relatively poor tools for controlling public debate, and their very generality
creates a substantial political check that prevents them from being unduly burdenso me.").
84. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41.52 (1999) ("[f)mprecise laws can be
attacked o n their face under two different doctrines. First, the overbreadth d octrine permits the
facial invalidation of laws that inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights if the
impermissible applications of the Jaw are substantial when 'judged in relation to the statute's
plainly legitimate sweep.' Second, even if an enactment does not reach a substantial amount
of constitutionally protected conduct, it may be impermissibly vague because it fails to
establish standards for the police and public that are sufficient to g uard against the arbitrary
deprivation of liberty interests.") (citatio ns omitted).
85. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 ( 1969) (a state may forbid advocacy of
illegal action, including violent overthrow of government, only "where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action."); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(immediate danger is required even though the government claims that membership in a radical
organization promoting violent overthrow will lead to that result): Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 673 ( 1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (immediate danger is required even though the
government claimed that a radical manifesto would lead to its viole nt overthrow); Ahrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616,627-628 (1919) (Holmes, J.. dissenting) (arguing that the clear and
present danger test was not met despite the government's claim that pamphlets would hinder
the war effort); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (articulating a clear and
present d anger test where the government claimed that pamphlets would encourage soldi ers to
evad e the draft and so undermine the war effort).
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A prior restraint on speech exists when a court imposes an injunction
prohibiting speech~ or when the government establishes a licensing system
under which individuals must obtain permission to speak. 88 A prior restraint,
in contrast to subsequent punishment, restricts speech before the public can
hear and evaluate it. Prior restraints were the initial target of the Free Speech
Clause, and they remain a particularly obnoxious form of speech restriction,
because they present dangers beyond those inherent in content-based
restrictions.89 The government must demonstrate a direct and immediate
danger to national security that cannot be addressed by other means in order
to suppress speech by a prior restraint.90
A prior restraint imposed by means of an administrative licensing system
poses dangers distinct from judicially-imposed injunctions. One danger of
a speech licensing system is that its administrators may suppress speech that
a court would determine to be constitutionally protected. Another danger is
that, even if administrators ultimately decide not to suppress expression, the
anticipated expense and difficulties, and potential denial of permission from
the licensor, may chill protected speech, as speakers forgo the creation of
information subject to the system in the first place. 91
The Constitution requires a series of procedural safeguards to render a
licensing system valid. One requirement is clear standards, tied to the
government's legitimate purpose, to counter the danger of viewpoint
7

86. See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS I 06- 125 (2002) (listing possible
of a hypothetical "antitenorism czar,. charged with devising the most effective means
to protect national security without respect to constitutional limitations, including controlling
the media, monitoring all co~munications, and criminalizing advocacy).
87. See, e.g. , Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
SR. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988)
("[I]n the area of free expression a licensing statute placing unbridled discretion in the hands
of a government official or agency constitutes a prior restraint and may result in censorship.");
Kunz v. New York. 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (holding that standard less discretion of a police chief
to issue a license to use a radio or loudspeaker on city property was unconstitutional as a prior
restraint on protected speech); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (striking down
a permit requirement for distribution of literature).
89. See Near, 283 U.S. at 713-714 (referring to freedom of the press).
90. 1n the Penwxon Papers Case, the Justices found that the government's attempted
restraint on publication of a classified study of Vietnam War policy failed to meet this high
standard. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). One court granted an
injunction to suppress publication of scientific information explaining the operation of a
hydrogen bomb, finding that the high standard was met, United States v. The Progressive, Inc.,
467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979), but the case became moot when the information was
published elsewhere pending appellate review.
91. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390
( 1973) ('"The special vice of a prior restraint is that communication will be suppressed, either
directly or by inducing excessive caution in the speaker ... .").
action~

2005]

SBU CLAUSES IN G OVERNMENT RESEARCH CONTRACTS

133

censorship that broad, vague standards present.92 These standards both limit
the licensor' s initial discretion and allow for meaningful judicial review. 9~
Another requirement is a specified, brief period for agency decisionmaking,
as well as expeditious judicial review that must be initiated by the
government and in which the government bears the burden of proof. 9 ~
These general First Amendment principles demonstrate that the terms of
the SBU secrecy clause could not constitutionally be imposed directly on
private speech. Because the government' s purpose in restraining the
publication of SBU information is to abate a national security danger, such
clauses are clearly content-based. SBU secrecy clauses are not, however,
crafted with the precision that would be necessary to demonstrate that the
information to be suppressed directly raises a strong and immediate national
security concern.
Another constitutional problem is that the prepublication review
requirement of the SBU secrecy clause imposes a prior restraint on private
speech without the necessary justification and procedural safeguards. The
definition of SBU information is not tied to a direct and immediate security
danger sufficient to justify a prior restraint. Neither is the definition precise
enough to limit an administrator's discretion. There is no standard time limit
for an agency prepublication review. And, although a contractor might
choose to challenge terms of the clause or agency decisions, there is no
provision for prompt judicial involvement at any stage of review.
Does the fact that the SBU secrecy clause is attached to government
funding fundamentally change the constitutional analysis? The cases
addressing speech conditions imposed on government employees and
contractors are relevant to this analysis.

92. See City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 760.
93. See id. at 77 1 (holding that an ordinance's "minimal requirement" that the mayor
state his reasons for denying a permit "cannot provide the st,j!ndards necessary to ensure
constitutional decision making, nor will it, of necessity, provide a solid foundation for eventual
judicial review. . . . Even if judicial review were relatively speedy, such review cannot
substitute for concrete standards to guide the decision-maker's discretion.").
94. See Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 321 (2002) ("In response w thel]
grave 'dangers of a censorship system,' we [have] held that a film licensing process must
contain certain procedural safeguards in order to avoid constitUiing an invalid prior restraint:
I) any restraint prior to judicial review can be imposed only for a specified hrief period during
which the status quo must be maintained; (2) e~peditious judicial review of that decision must
be available; and (3) the censor must bear the burden of going to court to suppress the speech
and must bear the burden of proof once in court."') (citations omitted).
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B. Speech Conditions on Government Employees and Contractors
Courts address the constitutionality of employee secrecy requirements
against the more general background of speech limitations imposed as a
condition of government employment. The government cannot restrict its
employees' unofficial speech on matters of public concern simply because it
disagrees with the message. At the same time, the government can sometimes
restrict employee speech that is otherwise entitled to full First Amendment
protection when it is necessary to serve some legitimate and important
government interest.95 The validity of an adverse employment action imposed
because of an employee's speech depends upon a balance ''between the
interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees."%
In United States v. National Treasury Employees Union,97 the Supreme
Court declared that the government bears a heavier burden in justifying a
speech-limiting rule when it imposes it on a broad class of employees by
prohibiting speech before it occurs.98 In such an instance, the "Government
must show that the interests of both potential audiences and a vast group of
present and future employees in a broad range of present and future
expression are outweighed by that expression's 'necessary impact on the
actual operation' of the Government."99 Moreover, the government must
'"demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that
the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material
way. '" 100
In cases involving government employees, courts have found that the
balance allows the government to impose secrecy clauses as a condition of
employment in some circumstances. In United States v. Marchetti, 101 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed the
constitutionality of a secrecy agreement signed by a Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) employee as a condition of employment. The court agreed
with Marchetti that "the First Amendment limits the extent to which the
United States, contractually or otherwise, may impose secrecy requirements

95. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668,675 (1996).
96. ld. at676 (citation omitted).
97. 513 u.s. 454 (1995).
98. ld. at 468 ("unlike an adverse action taken in response to actual speech, this ban [on
employees' acceptance of honoraria] chills potential speech before it happens.").
99. ld. (citation omitted).
100. !d. at 475 (quoling Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Fed. Communications
Comm'n, 512 U.S. 622,664 (1994)).
101. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972).
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upon its employees and enforce them with a system of prior censorship." ~
The court held the secrecy agreement valid, however, as applied to suppress
classified information. Nevertheless, it noted that "[w]e would decline [itsj
enforcement . . . to the extent that it purports to prevent disclosure of
unclassified information, for, to that extent, the oath would be in
contravention of his First Amendment rights." 103 The court also declared that
"[b]ecause we are dealing with a prior restraint on speech," the CIA must
respond promptly to a request for r~view, in a timeframe that "should not
104
exceed thirty days." Additionally, Marchetti was entitled to judicial review
of any disapproval, although "[b]ecause of the sensitivity of the area and
confidentiality of the relationship in which the information was obtained," the
court placed the burden of seeking such review on Marchetti. 105
In Snepp v. United States, 106 the government sought to go farther than in
Marchetti and to enforce the prepublication review requirement with respect
to a manuscript that did not contain information that was alleged to be
classified. 107 The Supreme Court accepted the government's claims,
upholding the constitutionality of a secrecy clause that obligated a CIA
employee to obtain agency prepublication review of any information "relating
to the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally" for the rest of
his life. 108
The Court first explained that the prepublication review promise was "an
integral part of Snepp's concurrent undertaking 'not to disclose any classified
information relating to the Agency without proper authorization.'" '()') It went
on to note that the clause was an '"entirely appropriate' exercise of the CIA
Director's statutory mandate to 'protec[t] intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure.'" 110 It held that Snepp had entered into a
voluntary agreement to submit any proposed publication for prior review, 111
and that even absent an express agreement the "Government has a compelling
interest in protecting both the secrecy of information important to our national
security and the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective
operation of our foreign intelligence service.'' 112
10

102. /d. at 1313.
103. /d. at 1317.
104. ld.
105. !d.
106. 444 u.s. 507 (1980).
107. !d. at 510 n.4 .
I 08. /d. at 508.
109. /d. at 508 (citation omitted).
II 0. !d. at 510 n.3 (citation omitted).
Ill. ld.; id. at 511 n.6 (suggesting that "the nature of Snepp's duties and his conceded
access to contldential sources and materials could establish a trust relationship" ).
112. !d. at 510 n.3.
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The government's strong secrecy interest meant that Snepp violated his
trust by failing to submit his manuscript for prepublication review, regardless
of whether it disclosed classified information. 113 The Court held that a CIA
employee's fiduciary duty included a requirement to follow the procedure of
prepublication review, because "publication of unreviewed material relating
to intelligence activities can be detrimental to vital national interests even if
rhc published information is unclassified [since it] may reveal information
that the CIA- with its broader understanding of what may expose classified
information and confidential sources- could have identified as harmful." 114
In support, it quoted the CIA Director, who testified that the threat that exemployees like Snepp would reveal classified information through their
publications had damaged the CIA's ability to obtain and retain confidential
sources. 115 Recognizing the government's need to establish a "reliable
deterrent against similar breaches of security," the Court imposed a
constructive trust in favor of the government on all the proceeds from Snepp' s
book. 116
After Snepp, President Reagan issued National Security Decision
Directive 84, which directed agencies that have access to classified
information to require employees to sign some sort of secrecy agreement. 117
The forms for employee signature originally purported to cover information

11 3. !d. at 511 ("Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon whether his
hook actually contained classified information.").
114. /d.at511-512.
115. !d.at512-513.
116. /d. at 514, 515-516. Justice Stevens, j oined by Justices Brennan and Marshall ,
dissented. He argued that the Coun seemed to acknowledge that "a CIA employee has a First
Amendment right to publish unclassitied information," id. at521 n.ll ( noting that this was "the
Fourth Circuit' s view in Marchetti"'), and that since Snepp's book contained no classified
information. it did not cause the harm that the government alleged. /d. at 522-523. He labeled
the constructi \'e trust a "drastic new remedy ... fashioned to enforce a species of prior restraint
on a citizen's right to criticize his government" that is "hound to have an inhibiting effect on
[Ihe] writing [of a t:ritical book]:' !d. at 526 & n. l7. He concluded by noting that "[i]nherent
in this prior restraint is the risk that the reviewing agency will misuse its authority to delay the
publi.::ation of a critical work or to persuade an autho r to modify the contents of his work
beyond the demands of secrecy. The character of the covenant as a prior restraint on free
speech surely imposes an especially heavy burden on the censor to justify the remedy it seeks.
It would take more than the Court has written to persuade me that that burden has been met.··
!d. :lt 526.
117. Nati onal Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 84, Safeguarding National Security
lnfcmnarion (n.d.) (stating that persons with access to classified information must sign
nondisclosure agreements and that those with access to Sensitive Compartmented Information
must also sign prepublication review agreements), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/
nsdd/nsdd-084.htm.
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that was either "classified or classifiable. " R Congress objected to the breadth
and vagueness of the coverage, and it placed a rider in appropriations
legislation that forbade the executive branch to use funds to enforce the
secrecy agreements beyond the scope of classified information. 119 A district
court invalidated the rider on separation of powers grounds, 120 but the
Supreme Court declined to rule on this constitutional question. 12 1 In another
opinion in the same case, the district court held that the secrecy clause
provision to protect "classifiable information," unless narrowed by a precise
definition, violated the free speech guarantee. 122 The government's current
nondisclosure and prepublication review forms refer to "classified"
123
information only.
Lower courts have reviewed other challenges to secrecy agreements. In
McGehee v. Casey,124 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit drew from Supreme Court precedent in determining that
secrecy clauses must "'protect a substantial government interest unrelated to
the suppression of free speech' .. . [and] be narrowly drawn to 'restrict
speech no more than is necessary to protect the substantial government
interest. "' 125 The court applied this test to uphold CIA censorship of
information classified "secret" which was contained in former agents·
writings and was obtained by them in the course of their employment. The
court noted that the government's legitimate secrecy interest could extend
only to classified information, 126 that standards more precise than a general
interest in protecting national security must define the government's
legitimate security interest, 127 and that judicial review must confirm the

118. lnfonnation Security Oversight Office, Classified Information Nondisclosure
Agreement (SF 189) (n.d.), reprinted in part in DYCUS, supra note 52, at 991.
I 19. Omnibus Continuing Resolution for Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202. §630,
101 Stat. 1329, 1329-432 (1987).
120. Nat' I Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 671 , 685 (D.D.C.
1988), vacated sub nom. Am. Foreign Svc. Ass'n v. Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 153 (1989).
121. Garfinkel, 490 U.S. at 158.
122. Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. United States, 695 F. Supp. 1196. 1202- I 203
(D.D.C. 1988).
123. Classified Information Nondisclosurt.' Agreement (SF 312) (Jan. 2000), amilohle
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/isoo/new_sf312.pdf; Sensirive Compartmented "'formation Non disclo.\·urt! Agreement (SF 4414) (Feb. 1997), available at http://www .usgs.gov/usgs-manual/
handbook/hb/440-7-h/440-7-h-figure5-2.pdf.
124. 718 F.2d I I 37 (D.C. Cir. 1983 ).
125. /d. at 1142-1143 (quoting Brown v. Giles. 444 U.S. 348. 354-355 (1980)).
126. McGehee, 7 18 F.2d at 1141 ("The government has no legitimate interest in censoring unc1assi fied materials.").
127. ld. at 1143-1145 ("The term ·national security' ... defined for classification purposes as ' the national defense and foreign relations of the United States' . .. is inherently
vague," but more specific guidelines in the governing executive order and CIA handbook
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connection between the information suppressed and the government's
interest. 1 2~
Since the Supreme Court's 1995 decision in United States v. National
Treasury Employees Union, 129 invalidating a ban on honoraria for government
employees, lower courts have applied the test used in that case to balance the
free speech interests of employees and audiences against the government's
actual and demonstrated tnterests as an employer to a range of prospective
speech restrictions.130 In Weaver v. United States Information Agency,
another panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit upheld a prepublicatio n review requirement that extended
beyond classified information. 131 The court construed the requirement
narrowly, however, finding that the regulation at issue called for employees
to submit publications for agency "clearance," a process that did not include
the authority to punish employees who subsequently published unapproved
material. m The court held that the particular free speech burden of prior
restraint should be considered as a factor in the interest balancing test

brought the ··secret" classification applied to censor material in McGehee's manuscript within
constitutional bounds).
128. !d. at 1149. The court noted that, in contrast to a citizen seeking infonnation under
F01A. an ex-employee has a constitutional right to disseminate information that he possesses,
which raises the standard of judicial review. In such an instance, the CIA must "justify
censorship with reasonable specificity, demonstrating a logical connection between the deleted
in formation and the reasons for classitication." !d. at I 148. The court anticipated that "in
camera review of affidavits, followed if necessary by further judicial inquiry, will be the norm.··
!d. at 1149.
129. 513 u.s. 454.
130. See, e.g., Crue v. Aiken, 370 F.3d 66H (7th Cir. 2004) (invalidating a university's
requirement that employees obtain approval before contacting prospective athletes);
Swartzwelder v. McNeilly. 297 F.3d 22H (3d Cir. 2002) (finding that a police department
requirement that employees receive permission from the police chief to testify as an experr
witness was prohably in valid ); Harman v. City o f New York. 140 F.3d Ill (2d Cir. 199H)
(invalidating a city policy requiring approval for employees to speak to the press); Weaver v.
United States info. Agency. 87 F.3d 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1996). cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1251 ( !997)
(upholding regulations requiring nonbinding prepublication review of government employee
expression); Sanj our v. EPA, 56 F.3d 85,90-9 1 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en bane) (invalidating an
EPA rule prohihiting employees from receiving travel expense rcimhursemcnt from private
sources for unoflicial speaking or writing).
131. 87 F.3d 1429 (D.C. C ir. 1996) (upholding a regulation requiring employees o f the
State Department. the United States Info rmation Agency, and the Agency for International
Development to submit all speaking, writing. and teaching material o n matters of "offi cial
concern," induding material relating to agency or foreign policy or United States foreign
relations. for nonbinding prepublication review).
I .'Q . !d. at I 436 ("If. contrary to the government's proposed interpretation, the regulation
were read to authorize punbhment for puhlication of material disapproved [for] inaccuracy,
inconsistency with current foreign policy. or sig ni fi<:antpotentialto affect U.S. foreign relations
in an adverse manner []then the reg ulation wou ld raise serious constitutional issues.").
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established by the government employment and secrecy clause cases. UJ
While a majority of the panel found the balance to favor the government,
Judge Wald dissented, finding that "[t]he affirmation of such a prepublication
clearance procedure based on viewpoint and content goes far beyond any
employee restriction previously upheld by this court or the Supreme Court. " 134
In Harman v. City of New York, 135 a Second Circuit panel cited and
distinguished Weaver when it invalidated a New York City requirement that
agency employees obtain approval to speak with media about their agencies'
policies or activities. In the balance between government and free speech
interests, the court found that the government's interest in protecting
confidential information relating to children and families was "undeniably
significant," but that it was less weighty than the need to protect national
security, which underpinned the prepublication review processes upheld by
other courts. 136 On the free speech side of the balance, the court noted that the
prepublication review and secrecy requirements adversely affected both the
employees' right to speak and the public's right to receive information of
public concern. The court agreed with Judge Wald's assessment of the
burdens on the employees' speech, noting the dangers of self-censorship,
delay, and viewpoint discrimination apparent in the process. m
Other cases reviewing the implementation of secrecy clauses with
prepublication review requirements for government employees have
confirmed the possibility of delays, chilling effects, and viewpoint
discrimination. Despite rules that seem to require prompt agency action, the
back-and-forth process between an ex-employee and an agency enforcing the
terms of a secrecy clause may take many months. 138 Even without threats or
concrete legal action, reviewing agencies can chill speech. 139 Judicial review,
although it presents the possibility of overturning agency redaction decisions,

133. /d. at 1440 (finding such an approach consistent with Supreme Court precedent).
134. /d . at 1456.
135. 140 F.3cl Ill (2d Cir. 1998).
136. !d. at 122 & n.6.
137. /d. at 140 F.3d at 120-121.
138. See, e.g., Penguin Books USA. Inc. v. Walsh. 756 F. Supp. 770,, 774-778 (S.D.N.Y.
1991 ), vacated and appeal dismissed, 929 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1991) (interchange between Jeffrey
Toobin. who was a prosecuting attorney in the Oliver North case, ancl the Office of the
Independent Counsel took more than a year): Stillman v. Dep't of Defense 209 F. Supp. 2d
185. 188 (D.D.C. 2002), rev'd and remanded, 319 F.3d 546 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (negotiation
between ex-employee of Los Alamos National Laboratory and federal agencies took eight
months).
139. Pen~uin Books, 756 F. Supp. at 778-779 (concluding that the Office of the Independent Counsel had subtly threatened Toobin hy refusing to discuss what action it woulcltakc
if he published his book. and that "(n]o one enjoys living under a cloud of threatened, or
intimated. legal action.").

140

JOURNALOFNATIONALSECURITYLAW&POUCY

[Vol.l:ll3

adds further delay to the review process. 140
The general balancing test for weighing the government's interests
against employees' free speech rights applies also to adverse employment
actions taken by the government against independent contractors.'~' The
Supreme Court has noted, however, that "differences between employees and
independent contractors" must inform the balance. 142
Specifically,
"[i]ndependent contractors ... lie somewhere between the case of government
employees, who have the closest relationship with the government, and our
other unconstitutional conditions precedents, which involve persons with less
close relationships with the government," and they are "more like ordinary
citizens whose viewpoints on matters of public concern the government has
no legitimate interest in repressing. 143 This observation would likely inform
the application of the balance to prospective speech restrictions on contractors
as well.
This series of government employee and contractor cases strongly
suggests that the current SBU secrecy clause, applied to private scientists,
intrudes too far into the free speech guarantee. Because the clause applies
prospectively, the relevant balance of interests requires the government to
show that the information to be suppressed has a '"necessary impact on the
[government's1actual operation'" and that the secrecy interest outweighs the
interests of both the affected researchers and potential audiences in receiving
their communications.'~ Moreover, the government must '"demonstrate that
the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will
in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way. " ' 145 Weighing
against the government in the balance are the imprecise definitions in the
SBU secrecy clause, which create the possibility of unauthorized
censorship, i~ 6 the particular free speech burdens of prepublication review, 147
the government's presumably lesser interest in protecting SBU information

140. Penguin Books, 929 F.2d at 72-74 (noti ng publication of the book before oral
argument on appeal, labeling the controversy moot, dismissing, and vacating the district court's
judgment).
141. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umhehr, 5 18 U.S. 668,680 (1996).
142. /d. at 678.
143. !d. at 680.
144. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454,468 (1995)
(citation omitted).
145. /d. at 475 (citation omitted).
146. Harman v. City of New York, 140 F.3d Ill, 120 (2d Cir. 1998) ("couns have found
that the potential for censorship in a regulation 'justifies an additional thumb on the employees'
side of [the] scales"') (citation omitted).
147. Weaver v. United States Info. Agency, 87 F.3d 1429, 1440 (D.C. 1996).
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as compared with classified information, 148 and its presumably lesser interest
in controlling the speech of private contractors as compared with that of
government employees. 149
The cases just described could be sufficient to confirm the
unconstitutionality of the current SB U secrecy clause. The balancing test they
establish might also be used to describe the boundaries and general outline of
a system to protect SBU information that comports with the free speech
guarantee. A different line of cases, however, complicates the constitutional
analysis. These cases address the constitutionality of speech limitations
imposed on private parties as conditions for participation in a government
program.

C. Speech Conditions on Access to Government Programs
SBU secrecy clauses impose conditions on access to government
programs that fund scientific research. Any SBU secrecy clause will limit
speech according to its content. The imprecise definitions and prepublication
review requirement of the current SBU secrecy clause not only result in
content discrimination, they also present the possibility of viewpoint
discrimination. While the employment and contractor cases require
definitions and procedures to limit the possibility of viewpoint discrimination,
the cases testing program conditions indicate that, in some circumstances,
such safeguards are not required. It is therefore necessary to examine the
general rules of the program condition cases and apply them specifically to
the funding of scientific research.

I. Programs That Require Precise, Viewpoint-Neutral Access Conditions
The Supreme Court's "forum" rules recognize that government efforts to
limit or skew private speech by means of a "subsidy," as well as by direct
restriction, may be unconstitutional. 150 The Court has made it clear that
traditional public forums, such as streets and parks, are held by the
government in trust for the people for the purpose of facilitating
communication. 151 The government must hold these forums open on a

148. McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1983)(gover;ment's legitimate
secrecy interest extends only to classified information).
149. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668,680 (1996).
150. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of tbe Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 836
(1995) (declaring that failure to fund a religious student publication when other publications
are funded ''cast[s] disapproval on particular viewpoints of (the University's] students [and]
risks the suppression of free speech and creative inquiry").
151. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator$' Ass· n. 460 U.S. 37.45 ( 1983).
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nondiscriminatory basis for private speakers, 152 even though those speakers
may well say things that undercut the government's own messages and policy
objectives. Additionally, the Court has recognized that "even content-neutral
time, place, and manner restrictions can be applied in such a manner as to
stifle free expression," 153 and it has accordingly treated forum access
decisions like other speech-licensing decisions, requiring that the definitions
be "narrowly drawn, reasonable, and definite," in order to "guide the
[administrator's) discretion and render it subject to effective judicial
review." 154
Beyond traditional government forums, other forums exist because the
government chooses to furnish access to property 155 or to provide funding for
their creation. 156 These created forums are government largesse that can be
withdrawn at will. 1 ~7 For this reason, as well as the fact that the government
administers some created forums for purposes having nothing to do with the
promotion of private speech, 158 the government has great discretion to
determine the boundaries of such forums and to exclude private speakers. 159

152. Ark. Educ. Television Comm 'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 ( 1998) ("[T]raditional
public fora are open for expressive activity regardless of the government's intent.").
153. Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 323 (2002).
154. /d. at 323-324 (citations omitted).
155. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677, 679 (explaining that the government creates a designated
public forum when it "intentionally open[s] a nontraditional public forum for public discourse,"
and it creates a nonpublic forum when it "allows selective access for individual speakers.").
156. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830 (stating that government funding may create a " metaphysical forum").
157 . Forbes. 523 U.S. at 681-682 (observing that onerous equal access requirements may
in fact undercut free speech clause values by diminishing speech opportunities if the operator
of the forum chooses not to provide access to anyone).
158. See, e.g., lnt'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992)
(speech rights at airport terminals); United States v. Kokinda.497 U.S. 720 (1990) (distribution
of literature on sidewalk outside post office).
159. These boundaries need not be described by a precise set of rules, Perry Educ. Ass' n
v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n. 460 U.S. 37, 39,47-48 (1983) (access to school mail system
controlled in part by individual school building principals); they may be articulated post hoc,
Forbes, 523 U.S. at 680 (finding that rules may be artic ulated after an access decision is made
where a broadcaster "reserved eligibility for participation in the debate to candidates for the
Third Congressional District seat'' and later "made candidate-by-candidate determinations as
to which of the eligible candidates would participate in the debate"); and they may, when
articulated, correlate very closely to viewpoint, Perry £due. Ass 'n, 460 U.S. at 65 (Brennan.
1., dissenting) (arguing that a policy allowing only the incumbent union to use the school mail
system was viewpoint discriminatory because it "amplitlied] the speech of the [incumbent
union], while repressing the speech of the [rival union] based on (its] point of view.''). See also
Forbes, 523 U.S. at 682 (upholding the exclusion of a congressional candidate from a debate
because the sponsoring organization's director believed neither voters nor news organizations
considered him a .. serious candidate").
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Still, the core prohibition of viewpoint discrimination by the government
applies. 160 That is, even though the government is distributing a discretionary
benefit, that discretion does not extend to the use either of explicitly
viewpoint-discriminatory criteria 161 or of broad, vague standards that create
a significant risk of viewpoint discrimination. 162
The government sometimes provides assistance to private speakers
without creating a forum in order to promote government policies other than
the encouragement of private speech. 163 The Supreme Court has emphasized
the government's discretion in structuring non-forum subsidy programs, but
it has also noted that "even in the provision of subsidies, the government may
not 'ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas. '" 164 This means that in most
instances the government cannot condition access to a subsidy on the
viewpoint of a recipient's speech either in explicit terms or by the application
of imprecise criteria that could allow program administrators to engage in

160. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 682 ("[T]he exclusion of a speaker from a nonpublic forum
must not be based on the speaker's viewpoint and must otherwise be reasonable in light of the
purpose of the property."); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (holding that the state is forbidden
"to exercise viewpoint discrimination, even when the limited public forum is one of its own
creation").
161. The Court has repeatedly held that exclusion of religious speakers from a created
forum is unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford
Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001 ): Rosenberger; Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 508 U.S. 384 ( 1993); Widmarv. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). Bur see Locke v. Davey,
540 U.S. 712 (2004) (holding that exclusion of a theology student from a state scholarship
program is not exclusion of a speaker from a created forum, but is a funding decision that does
not violate the Free Exercise Clause).
162. See, e.g., Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 324 (2002) (finding that
while a Chicago Park District ordinance required participants to obtain a permit to hold rallies
in parks, the ordinance was enforceable because it "provide[ d) 'narrowly drawn, reasonable and
definite standards' to guide the licensor's determination" (citation omitted)); AIDS Action
Comm. of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d I, 12 (1st Cir.
1994) ("The [access] Policy itself is almost impossible to understand. The purported exclusion
of all messages or representations 'pertaining to sexual conduct' is so vague and broad that it
could cover much of the clothing and movie advertising commonly seen on billboards and in
magazines .... We think that the opportunities for discrimination created by this Policy have
been borne out in practice, and that this case presents an unrebutted claim of discrimination in
the application of supposedly neutral standards.").
163. See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 237 n.7 (2003) (finding
that the purpose of providing Internet tenninals in public libraries is not "to encourage a
diversity of views from private speakers"): Nat'! Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S.
569, 586 (1998) ("In the context of arts funding, in contrast to many other subsidies, the
Government does not indiscriminately 'encourage a diversity of views from private speakers."'
(quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835)).
164. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 587 (quoting Regan v. Taxation With Representation of
Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983)).
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viewpoint censorship. 165 Exceptions exist, however.
2. Programs That May Justify Explicitly Viewpoint-Discriminatory
Funding Conditions
One exception to the rule against viewpoint discrimination in government
funding exists when a purpose of the program is to produce speech, and
private individuals effectively become government speakers through
participation in the program. In Rust v. Sullivan, 166 health care providers
claimed that their free speech rights were violated by government regulations
prohibiting them, as a condition of receiving family planning funds, from
engaging in abortion counseling, referral, or advocacy. The Supreme Court
held that "[t]his is not a case of the Government 'suppressing a dangerous
idea,' but of a prohibition on a project grantee or its employees from engaging
in activities outside of the project's scope." 167 The Court later described Rust
as involving the government's use of "private speakers to transmit specific
information pertaining to its own program." 16R In such an instance, when the
government "disburses funds to private entities to convey a governmental
message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its
message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee." 169
Access conditions that explicitly discriminate on the basis of viewpoint
are valid only when private program participants become government
speakers, however. In Legal Services Corp. v. Velasquez, 170 the Supreme
Court invalidated a condition placed on Legal Services Corporation (LSC)
attorneys that prohibited them from challenging existing welfare laws.
According to the Court, "Congress cannot recast a condition on funding as a

165. Regan. 461 U.S. at548 (uph(>lding a tax benefit for lobbying by veterans' organizations but not other types of non profit organizations. noting that eligibility for the benefit did
not depend on the content of speech and that "[t]he case would be different if Congress were
to discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to "'aim[] at the suppression of
dangerous ideas."') (citation omitted); Speiser v. Randall. 357 U.S. 5 I 3 ( 1958) (state cannot
condition access to a property tax exemption on agreement of the recipient to sign a declaration
stating that he did not advocate forcible overthrow of the United States government).
166. 500U.S. I 73( 1991).
167. /d. at 194.
168. Rosenbergerv. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819,833 (1995).
More recently, the Court has emphasized that Rust is not limited to '·situations where the
government seeks to communicate a speci fic message," but extends to other instances where
the government's purpose is something other than to facilitate private speech. United States
v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194,237 n.7 (2003) (stating that Rusr applies when the
governme nt's purpose is to provide library patrons with m aterial "of requisite and appropriate
quality,'' which excludes pornography).
169. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
170. 531 U.S. 533 (2001 ).
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mere definition of its program in every case, lest the First Amendment be
reduced to a simple semantic exercise." 171 The Court found the LSC funding
condition to be "aimed at the suppression of ideas thought inimical to the
Government's own interest." 172 The Court distinguished Rust on the ground
that "the LSC program was designed to facilitate private speech, not to
promote a governmental message." 173 It noted that "certain restrictions may
be necessary" when "the government establishes a subsidy for specified
ends," 174 but it found that this condition was an unconstitutional "attempt to
draw lines around the LSC program to exclude from litigation those
arguments and theories Congress finds unacceptable but which by their nature
are within the province of the courts to consider." 175
Although the Court has indicated that the discretion it described in Rust
v. Sullivan applies to a broad range of government funding decisions, there is
no indication that this discretion includes employment of the potentially
viewpoint-discriminatory access criteria of the SB U secrecy clause in funding
scientific research. A viewpoint-specific program like the one in Rust, which
restricts counseling about abortion, has as part of its purpose communication
outside the government. Such a program may impose a funding condition
that limits the speech of recipients in order to control the communication,
which is part of the "product" of the program.
Most of the government's scientific research funding, by comparison,
does not have communication by the private contractor to members of the
public on behalf of the government as part of its purpose. Contracts for
scientific research typically anticipate tangible products that will be delivered
to the government. These products may be things. or reports, or a
combination of nonspeech things and information. An exchange of
information is part of the bargain, but the bargain's purpose is only the
exchange between contractor and government. The government can control
the content of the information for which it contracts, within the bounds of
ethics and authorship, by prescribing the type of information sought and the

171. /d. at 547.
172. !d. at 549.
173. /d. at 542. The Court has since emphasized that the government' s discretion to
condition access to a subsidy such as that upheld in Rust extends beyond circumstances where
private participants become government speakers. Am. Library Ah 'n, 539 U.S. at 213 n.7.
It did so, however, when upholding an access condition that limited participant speech
according to content, not viewpoint. /d. at 204 ("(T]he government has broad discretion to
make content-based judgments in deciding what private speech to mak.e available to the
public."). There is no indication in American Library A.1·sociation that the Court would uphold
explicitly viewpoint discriminatory access criteria outside the context of the private program
participants delivering a government message.
174. Velasque:, 531 U.S. at 543 (citing Rust).
175. !d. at 546.
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form of presentation. It can also decide whether to e ndorse and publicize the
information products of its contracts. Because the government does not
generally use research contracts to advance a viewpoint-specific policy,
however, viewpoint-discriminatory limitations on the speech of contractors
176
are not necessary to fulfill the research program' s purpose. Consequently,
Rust does not validate the viewpoint- discriminatory features of the current
SBU secrecy clause.

3. Selective Speech Funding Programs
The government generally cannot condition access to federal programs
on vague, broad standards that create a significant risk that administrators will
engage in viewpoint discrimination. An exception exists, however, when in
order "[t]o fulfill their traditional missions . .. [public entities] must have
broad discretion to decide what [privately produced] material to provide to
177
their patrons."
In such programs, the requirement of clear, definite
standards to channel an administrator's decisionmaking fundamentally
conflicts with the discretion the administrator must have to make the
selective, quality-based access decisions that fulfill the program's purpose,
which is to present to a designated audience private speech that reflects
government views. Fulfilling the program's legitimate purpose requires the
toleration of a risk that broad access standards may be misused.
When the government acts as an editor, combining private speech into a
unique whole, it may properly use broad, vague standards for access to
government benefits that are not s ubject to effective judicial review. The
combination of private speech is, itself, a message. m The government is also
entitled to use considerable discretion in allocating space among private

176. In addition to contracts and cooperative agreements for specific "deliverables," the
government may make grants for scientific research that indeed have communication outside
the government as a goal. By contrast to contracts for specific products. which fulfill a
particular government objective, such grants support the interests and agendas of individual
scientists or institutions, with the broad purpose of creating and disseminating information that
will spur scientific discovery and progress. But while communication beyond the government
is a purpose of such programs, it is nor a purpose that justifies a speech-limiting condition.
When the dissemination of information is a primary purpose of a research-funding program,
SBU secrecy clauses actually subvert, rather than enhance, the communication objective. In
other words, the government lacks a viewpoint-based policy in such programs that would
support SBU secrecy clause restrictions.
177. Am. Library Ass 'n, 539 U.S. at 204.
178. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998) ("Altho ugh programming decisions often involve the compilation of the speech of third panies, the
decisions nonetheless constitute communicative acts.").
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entries, including choosing among different points of view. 179 In addition,
government entities may act as editors when they put together reports,
newsletters, 180 Web sites, conferences, ceremonies, and numerous other types
of private speech compilations. 181 Although there is a risk of abuse, the
values served by allowing the discretion outweigh that risk. 182
The government may also exercise a large degree of subjective judgment
when it creates or administers programs designed to identify private speech
that meets a particular standard of "quality" or "appropriateness." Government entities such as schools, prisons, and the military have instructional and
safety responsibilities with respect to their populations, and they may select
and present private speech that they deem appropriate to their missions. 1g3
Libraries make quality and appropriateness decisions when making their
selections, and Congress, too, can impose C..)ntent-based conditions on the
acquisitions that it funds. 184
Congress can require the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) to
consider "general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and
values of the American public" when distributing arts funding, 185 even though

179. /d. at 673 ("[Editors] must exercise [discretion) to fulfill their journalistic purpose
and statutory obligations.").
180. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm' n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 t 1986) {PG&E'~
newsletter "receives the full protection of the First Amendment").
181. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 674 (comparing broadcasters' activities to a university 's
commencement speaker selection and a public institution 's lecture series choices).
182. Id. (noting that in the context of broadcaster discretion,"' [c]alculated risks of abuse
are taken in order to preserve higher values"' {quoting Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Democratic Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 125 (1973)).
183. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va .. 515 U.S. 819, 833
( 1995) ("When the University determines the content of the education it provides, it i~ the
University speaking, and we have permitted the government to regulate the content of what is
or is not expressed .... "):Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 415 (1989) (stating that
regulations restricting inmates' receipt of certain types of publications. by mail are penuitted
only when the particular type of publication is "detrimental to [prison] security"); Brown v.
Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 356 ( 1980) ("Since a commander is charged with maintaining morale,
discipline, and readiness, he must have authority over the distribution of materials that could
affect adversely these essential attributes of an effective military force.").
184. See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 211-212(2003)('·[The
funding programs] were intended to help public libraries fulfill their traditional role of
obtaining material of requisite and appropriate quality for educational and informational
purposes. . . . Especially because public libraries have traditionally excluded pornographic
material from their other collections, Congress could reasonably impose a parallel limitation
on its Internet assistance programs.").
185. Nat' I Endowment for the Arts v. Finley. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
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such criteria create a risk of abuse. 186 NEA grants are "selective" or
"competitive" subsidies, 1s7 which depend upon an "excellence" threshold that
is "inherently content-based." 188 Such quality-based government programs
abound, and they are valuable. 189 But in designing them "it is not always
feasible for Congress to legislate with clarity." 190 Instead, "the Government
may allocate competitive funding according to criteria that would be
impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a criminal penalty at
stake." 191 Meeting the purpose of the program- selecting, rewarding, and
presenting "quality" private speech to the public - justifies conditioning the
government benefit on broad, vague standards.
By contrast to the many programs that require subjective evaluations of
the speech of private participants, the program of funding private research is
not "selective" in a way that justifies the potentially viewpoint -discriminatory
features of the SBU secrecy clause. It is important in this analysis to
distinguish the selectivity the government may appropriately exercise over the
activity of scientific research which it funds from the operation of the SBU
secrecy clause itself, which addresses the speech of the people who do the
research.
The program of supporting private research involves selective funding,
which means that the government has broad discretion to consider a range of
factors in deciding how to allocate funds among research priorities and among
applicants . In exercising this discretion, Congress and the agencies with
statutory responsibility for awarding funding can set and apply standards that
reflect their policy preferences. These policy preferences will be value-laden
and may well be viewpoint-based. Decisions about what type of research to
fund and who shoulq receive funding to do it will involve a range of
subjective factors not susceptible of rigorous judicial review. Such subjective
funding decisions will nevertheless determine what scientific work gets done
and what information is available for public consumption. What renders the
exercise of this discretion constitutional is the government's responsibility for
determining funding priorities and its public accountability for its exercise of
that subjective judgment.
Yet while the government's discretion to award research funding is very
broad, it does not include the right to impose SBU secrecy clause conditions

186. /d. at 583-5!l4 (noting respondent's claim that the criteria " are sufficiently subjective that the agency could utilize them to engage in viewpoint discrimination," but recognizing
that risk is present with determination of "artistic excellence" as well).
187. !d . at5!l7, 589.
188. !d. at 5!l6.
I !l9. /d. at 589 (listing programs).
190. /d.
191. !d. at 587-588.
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that regulate not the product of the research but the speech of the researcher.
The selective decisions about what type of research to fund, although they
will undoubtedly affect the content of the information in the speech market,
do not provoke a Free Speech Clause analysis, because the access criteria do
not refer to speech directly. By contrast, SBU secrecy clauses implicate the
free speech guarantee because their terms limit speech directly. The cases
indicate that only a government purpose to select and present information of
a particular appropriateness or quality can justify imprecise criteria to
evaluate the private speech selected. The scientific research funding to which
the government attaches SBU secrecy clauses does not have as its purpose the
presentation of private speech to the public in a compilation or otherwise with
the imprimatur of a government judgment about quality. 192 The use of such
a clause thus cannot be justified as an explicit selective speech restriction. 19 ·l

192. By contrast to contracts to fulfill instrumental government purposes. some grant
funding has information dissemination as a goal. NORRIS, supra note 4 , at 3 n.4 ("Although
the specific charge to the Task Force was to identify restrictive language in both contracts and
grants, a review of the submi ss ions indicates that, with only a few exceptions, all the
restrictions were with respect to contracts."). Government agencies have thus far not sought
to impose SBU secrecy clauses in this realm. When disscminarion of the product of funded
research is a purpose of the program, the government could perhaps impose a requirement that
it receive and evaluate information produced by the research before the researcher presents it
to the public as the product of government funding. The program's purpose would be to inject
into the public realm scientific research that the government deems "appropriate,., meaning 1'1at
it does not present a national security danger. The reach of the government review would be
only into the product of the program, and the review would effectuate the program's purpose
of mixing the government's quality judgment with private speech to pre~ent a particular
selection of material to the public. This type of program would not, however, justify th~:
current SBU secrecy clause. which extends to publications that are not the product of the
program.
193. Although the selectivity of scientific funding does not justify access conditions that
directly limit private speech, the government can, as with any decision, constitutionally
consider impacts beyond the explicit scope of the project in allocating funding. While the
government cannot know exactly what information will result from a research project. it can
consider the national security danger that information from a project might pose when it uwards
funding, and even without explicit congressional direction agencies could. depending on the
scope of their statutory authority, do the same. Political accountability serves as a check on the
government's decision to use a particular factor in its decisionmaking. Congress\ decisions
to condition funding of the arts and of library Internet connections according to ..decency ..
generated broad public debate. See Alicia M. Choi, National Endowmentfor the Arts v. Finll'y:
A Dispute Over the "Decency and Respect" Provision, 32 AKRON L. REV. 327. 327 ( 1999)
("Since Congress incorporated the 'decency and respect' provision into the [NEAJ guidelines.
the NEA has suffered intense scrutiny and criticism from the public.").
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D. Other Considerations
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the cases involving program
conditions do not give the government unlimited discretion to restrict the
speech of researchers who receive funding. Rather, the constitutional rule
that prohibits viewpoint discrimination among program participants applies
to the program of funding scientific research. This conclusion confirms what
the employee and contractor cases strongly suggest: a system of SBU
information controls must contain precise definitions linked to identified
levels of national security danger that limit the discretion of program
administrators to engage in viewpoint discrimination.
Beyond this
requirement, the program conditions cases indicate that SBU information
controls that limit the content of private participant speech, as opposed to its
viewpoint, may be constitutional when the government's interest in protecting
national security supports them. The employee and contractor cases indicate
that even when the government asserts a legitimate interest in controlling
private speech to protect national security, a balance between the government
and the free speech interests will determine the constitutionality of particular
controls. Those cases provide some details to factor into this balance. The
program conditions cases offer additional considerations that are particularly
relevant in determining the constitutionality of SB U secrecy clauses.

1. Accountability
Most evident in the cases involving government assistance to speech is
a constitutional requirement that the government stand politically accountable
for the extent to which it influences the content or viewpoint of private
speech. Ensuring accountability is important because of the particular danger
to democracy that government subsidized private speech presents. The
danger is that the government's influence will be invisible. 194 The
government can engage in viewpoint discrimination in its own speech,
because when government officials or agencies speak, the government source
is obvious and the public can evaluate the content of the speech with the
identity of the speaker in mind. The Supreme Court has said that the
government can "promote its own policies or ... advance a particular idea,
[because] it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the political

194. Planned Parenthood of South Carolina, Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 798 (4th Cir.
2004) (opinion of Michaels, J.) (obscuring the government's role in promoting a message on
specialty license plates "thwarts 'the rationale behind the government' s authority to draw
otherwise impermissible viewpoint distinctions in the government speech context,' namely, 'the
accountability inherent in the political process."') (citation omitted).
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process for its advocacy." 195
When the government speaks through private agents, on the other hand,
even if those agents are carrying out a government program, the government
source is less obvious. Listeners may be confused about the source of the
speech, and this confusion may work to the government's persuasive
advantage. The government can hide its responsibility for the message, or it
can deliver the message in other ways, creating the impression that
independent private speakers have adopted the message as their own. 196
These effects skew the balance of viewpoints in the marketplace of ideas, 197
undermining citizens' ability to evaluate and criticize the messages and
policies of the government they have elected.
Accountability is the principle that grounds the government's ability to
discriminate according to viewpoint or to employ imprecise criteria when it
presents private speech to the public. The same type of accountability should
ground a government decision to keep private information secret. The
definitions and procedures of the classification system render the government
accountable for its administration of that system. When it imposes
nondisclosure or prepublication review requirements to protect classified
information, the redacted information in private speech must be traceable to
information held by the government that has been determined by a
government official to meet standards that demonstrate a threshold level of
national security danger. The accountability principle suggests that these
same sorts of safeguards must exist if the government seeks to suppress SBU
information.

2. Scope of Program Condition
Another consideration in evaluating a funding condition is its reach into
the participant's private speech. In FCC v. League of Women Voters of
California, 198 the Supreme Court invalidated a condition of public broadcast
funding that prohibited recipient stations from "editorializing." The Court

195. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217. 235
(2000).
196. See, e.g., John Files, Bush's Drug Videos Broke UJIV, Accountahilit_v Office Decides. N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2005, at Al6 (reporting the Government Accountability Office's
finding that the Bush administration's videos detailing the effects ot drug use among young
people were illegal "covert propaganda" because they did not identify the government as the
source of the materials); Robert Pear, White Hou.l'e ·.1· Medicare Videos Are Ruled Illegal. N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 2004 (same with respect to Bush's administration's Medicare promotional
videos).
197. David Cole, supra note 73, at 705 (''The problem with both [government speech
suppression and se lective support of private speech] is their skewing effect on public debate.").
198. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
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later distinguished this case in Rust v. Sullivan, noting that it "placed a
condition on the recipient of the subsidy rather than on a particular program
or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the
protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program." 199 It
was crucial to the Court in Rust that the grantees in League of Women Voters
could not "segregate ... activities according to the source of ... funding." 200
By contrast, recipients of family planning funds in Rust remained "free ... to
pursue abortion-related activities when they are not acting under the auspices
of the [federal] project."201
The Rust decision was itself distinguished in another case that turned on
the scope of a program condition. That case, Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford} r. University v. Sullivan/ 02 involved the withdrawal by the National
Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute of the National Institutes of Health of a
proffered five-year contract with Stanford Medical School to perform
anificial heart research after the school refused to agree that it would submit
any proposed release of preliminary results for prepublication review.203 The
court noted, and the government conceded, that the prepublication review
procedure constituted a prior restraint that the government could not impose
by means of regulation on private researchers not funded by a government
grant or contract. :!w The question then became "whether the grant of public
funds takes the present situation out of the category of impermissible
suppression of speech." 205 The court rejected the government's claim that the
university researchers' free speech rights should be determined as if they were
government employees on the theory that the government could have hired
scientists as employees to do the research. 2()(> Instead, the court looked to

199. Rust v. Sullivan. 500 U.S. 173, 197 (1991 ) (emphasis in original).
200. /d. The Court continued, "We expressly recognized, however, that were Congress
to permit the recipient stations to ·establish "affiliate" organizations which could then use the
station ·s facilities to editorialize with non federal funds, such a statutory mechanism would
plainly be valid."' /d. (quoting League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 400); see also Regan v.
Taxation With Representatio n of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 552-553 (1983) ( l:llackmun, J.,
concurring) (approving the prohibition of substantial lobbying by tax-exempt charities on the
ground th;Jt they could e~tablish lobbying affiliates).
20 l. Rust, 500 U.S. at 198.
20~. 773 F. Supp. 472 (D.D.C. I 99 I).
203. /d. at 474. T he specific terms of the clause required researchers to give 45 days'
advance notice that they intended to publish preliminary findings, and, if the contracting officer
objected. to give the offi cer an additi onal sixty days to respond to tbe researcher's written
claim.
204. /d. at 475.
205. !d.
206. !d. at 475 n.8 (noting that such "an argument could be made with respect to almost
any activity, and its acceptance would in prdctice erode First Amendment freedoms on the
widest scale." ).
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cases addressing speech conditions on government benefits.
Noting the ''confusion among (the cases.]"207 the court applied and
distinguished the Supreme Court's holding in Rust to find the proposed
secrecy clause overbroad, in that it restricted researchers' speech outside the
scope of the project. 208 Although the clause referred to research results that
were a part of the project, the court found that it effectively restricted any
speech relating to artificial heart research that the scientists undertook during
the five-year life of the contract, and perhaps after, even when they were not
doing project work. 209 The court also found the terms of the clause vague,
permitting contracting officers unfettered discretion to intrude on the
specially protected sphere of free expression within the university. 210 The
court questioned the government's asserted public health grounds for
requiring prepublication review, as well. 211 While the court acknowledged its
obligation to follow Rust, it noted that a broad reading of the Supreme Court's
decision in that case "would be an invitation to government censorship
wherever public funds flow, and ... present an enormous threat to the First
Amendment rights of American citizens and to a free society."212 According
to the court, "Rust is consistent with a decision to allow Stanford to use its
own judgment on when and what to publish, notwithstanding that its research
is supported with federal funds. 213 The appellate court dismissed the
government's appeal as moot.
Although SBU secrecy clauses explicitly prohibit disclosure of
information provided or produced as part of the project, they also have an
impact on private speech outside the project. While researchers theoretically
should be able to segregate their speech in order to omit SBU information that
relates to the project, as a practical matter project information may provide

207. !d. at 475.
208. /d. at 476.
209. !d. at 476 n.l3 ("Defendants' ban on preliminary reporting could not validly be defended on the basis that it is tied to the heart research program rather than the researchers. for
the latter ... would be precluded from speaking or publishing about artificial heart research
even on their own time. Any attempt to examine such speech or publication with a view to
determining whether or not the information came to these scientists as a consequence of their
work on the federally-financed project or from their general familiarity with the subject would
require such intrusive examination into thought processes that it could not conceivably be
undertaken. It should be noted in this connection that Dr. Oyer has- worked for almost twenty
years on the development of a self-contained artificial heart device.'').
210. /d. at 477.
211. /d. at 477 n.l6 (rejecting the claim that restricting the speech of Stanford scientists
is necessary to protect the public from false commercial claims, and rejecting the legitimacy
of the government's expression of concern about "protecting prospective patients from
unwarranted hope.").
212. /d. at478.
213. /d.at479.
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necessary building blocks for future research. In the publication of that
research SBU information may be densely intermingled with information
gleaned without government sponsorship. This intertwining of project and
non-project speech in the context of scientific research must weigh in the
balance between the government's interest and free speech concerns.

3. Government Power
Other relevant considerations affecting the constitutional analysis of the
SBU clause include the nature of the government benefit and the likely impact
of the access condition on speakers and the public audience. That impact may
be measured in part by the government's power over the means of
communication at issue. 214 The requirement that government hold open
property that has traditionally been used for public discourse stems in part
from this consideration. The same concern prompted the Supreme Court to
recognize that, despite the government's broad discretion to structure its own
programs, "censorship" of the mail according to either content or viewpoint
would raise "grave constitutional questions."m
Not many speech opportunities are as government-dominated as
traditional gathering places or the mail.216 Still, when the government
exercises substantial control over a discrete type of speech opportunity, the
importance of content-based access conditions will be magnified by the extent
of its control. Justice Souter, dissenting in a recent Supreme Court case,
quoted a district court decision that invalidated an NEA funding condition, 217
arguing that the "decency and respect" condition would have a particularly
dangerous "chilling effect" on artists because of"practical realities offunding
in the artistic community."m Not only does NEA "occup[y] a dominant and
influential role in the financial affairs of the art world," he said, but because
NEA grants require private matching funds and create prestige that may allow
artists to gain private support for future projects, "NEA's funding

214. See Richard A. Epstein. Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power. and
the Limits of Consellf, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 56 (1988) (asserting that the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine acts as a check on government monopoly of public resources. including
speech forums).
215. Hannigan v. Esquire. Inc.. 327 U.S. 146, 155-156 ( 1946) (invalidating on statutory
grounds a content-hased condition on access to the mail system).
21 o. In fact, the mail is becoming less government-dominated, as alternatives. such as
other cmTiers and e-mail, consume parts of the market.
2 17. Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer. 754 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal. 199])
(holding that a requirement that NEA grantees certify in writing that no fund s would he used
on "obscene" projects was unconstitutionally vague).
2 18. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 621 (1998) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
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involvement in a project necessarily has a multiplier effect in the competitive
market for funding of artistic endeavors."219
This consideration forms part of the background for evaluating the
constitutionality of SBU information secrecy controls. Although the
government is not the only funder of scientific research, its market power,
especially with respect to university scientists who conduct basic research, is
substantial. This means that information suppressed by the government is
unlikely to be supplied by other sources, and to the extent that government
administrators have the discretion to suppress information on unauthorized
grounds, those decisions may significantly skew the marketplace of scientific
ideas. While industry, the entity that funds much other scientific research,
may also be prone to secrecy,220 the government has a special constitutional
responsibility to keep channels of public communication open. This
responsibility, combined with the impact of government action that
suppresses speech, weighs against broad government discretion to edit private
scientific speech as a condition of government funding.

4. The Special Free Speech Role of the University
The university plays a special role in preserving and promoting speech
free of government influence. The Supreme Court has emphasized the role
of the university as a "vital center[] for the Nation's intellectual life" that
should be free from "the chilling of individual thought and expression."221
The Court has noted this special role of the university in the context of both
created forums222 and other funding conditions. 223 In Rust v. Sullivan, the
Court explicitly cautioned that its decision upholding an abortion counseling
restriction on family planning funds was "not to suggest that funding by the

219. !d. at 621-622.
220. See Barry Meier, Contracts Keep Drug Research Out <JfReach. N.Y. TrMES. Nov.
29, 2004, at A l (describing secrecy clauses imposed by drug companies on academic
•
researchers).
221. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va.. 515 U.S. 819, 835-836
( 1995); see also Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 237 (2000)
(Souter J .. concurring) ("Our understanding of academic freed om has included .. . liberty from
restraints on thought, expression, and association in the academy ... ."').
222. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835 ("(The danger 10 lihet1y] is especially real in the
University setting, where the State acts against a background and tradition of thought and
experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition.'").
223. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 17 3, 200 ( 1991 ) ('"[Tjhe university is a traditional sphere
of free expression so fundamental to the functioning of our society that the Government's
ability to control speech within that sphere by means of conditions attached to the expenditure
of Government funds is restricted by the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of the First
Amendment."
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Government, even when coupled with the freedom of the fund recipients to
speak outside the scope of the Government-funded project, is invariably
sufficient to justify Government control over the content of expression."224
The government's imposition of SBU secrecy clauses raises additional
constitutional concerns in the university setting. The government has broad
power to keep its own information secret and to require its employees to keep
that information secret. It can conduct scientific research intramurally, and
it can exercise great control over dissemination of the resulting information.
But the structure of such internal controls makes a difference under the
Constitution, because it leaves the government politically accountable for its
actions, at least to some degree.
This consideration suggests that SBU secrecy controls that reach into
university discourse pose a particular danger because of the special role of the
university in promoting innovation and expression outside of government
control, and because, with respect to scientific information in particular, the
university has a special role in conducting research for the purpose of
expansion and dissemination of knowledge. Although the government shapes
expression on university campuses in many ways, the expectation is that
expression not identified as the government's will be unconstrained. The
special role of the university thus must weigh in the constitutional balance.
III. RESTRUCTURING GOVERNMENT CONTROLS OVER SBU INFORMATION
IN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH CONTRACTS

General Free Speech Clause doctrine and the rules specific to secrecy
clauses in government employment contracts suggest that the government can
only restrict private speech if the information it contains is classified. As a
bright line rule, this conclusion has some appeal. Nevertheless, the current
security environment, including the possibility that potentially dangerous
information will unexpectedly result from funded research, makes it difficult
and perhaps counterproductive to try to classify all the information that the
government may have a legitimate national security interest in keeping secret.
This is true of the government's own information and also of information
contained in the speech of private parties who receive government funding.
Consequently, the government may be able to assert a strong enough national
security interest in some types of SBU information and some types of
scientific research to impose some level of secrecy on it.
The details of a constitutional system for protecting SBU information will
depend in part on the government's careful assessment of its own interests.
Bearing in mind the analysis of cons!itutional doctrine outlined above and the

224.

!d. at 199.
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apparent defects in the current SB U secrecy clause, such an assessment might
suggest a new system of SBU information controls with the following
characteristics:
A. A Uniform System with Precise Definitions of Types of SBU
Information Linked to Identified Levels
of National Security Danger

Courts have sometimes upheld the government's right to suppress
classified information contained in private speech because the classification
system establishes reasonably clear definitions that apply across government
agencies. These definitions require administrators to determine that particular
information poses a real and substantial danger to national security. Clear
definitions limit an administrator's ability to suppress private speech for
reasons not linked to national security, both by channeling the initial decision
and by allowing for effective judicial review. Uniform definitions across
government agencies add legitimacy to particular decisions as administrators
must justify them with reference to the entire structure.
To satisfy the Constitution, a system for protecting SBU information must
at a minimum have each of these features. One possibility would be to revise
the current classification system definitions to include certain types of SBU
information. 225 Another would be to devise a parallel system of SBU
protection, with a structure that resembles the current classification system.
Definitions that are uniform, precise, and explicitly linked to national security
danger would not guarantee that a system of SBU information protection
would comport with the Constitution. They would, however, be a necessary
first step.
B. Procedures to Ensure That Particular Information Is Properly
Categorized as Sensitive But Unclassified
The system for protecting classified information includes procedures
calling for internal and judicial review of the initial classification decision,
and ongoing review to ensure that classification is still appropriate. A
government agency physically possesses information designated as classified,
as well, which enables concerned employees to question improper
classification decisions. These same procedures should be part of a system
for protecting SBU information.

225. See HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION, supra note 23 (containing recommendation of the
Defense Department's JASON scientific advisory panel thatthe present system for information
security ought to be "radically changed," and proposing an alternate model that seeks to
maximize information flow up to a determined level of acceptable risk).
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Although an SBU system might not have the same security clearance and
handling requirements as the classification system, it should have parallel
procedures to protect the free speech rights of individuals. These procedures
should ensure that SBU information is properly categorized and periodically
reviewed. They should also provide government accountability for keeping
such information secret. In applying such a system to the funding of
scientific research, the responsibility must be on the government agency to
identify SBU information that it discloses in support of a project, as well as
information created by the project that it considers to be SBU. As to newly
created information, the government must take possession of it, label it, and
hold it according to the established SBU information control structure. Only
in this way can the continuing checks that protect the free speech right
become a part of the structure.

C. SBU Information Controls That Acknowledge and Include the Value
of the Free Flow of Scientific Information and That Evidence a
Commitment to U.se the Least Speech-Restrictive Means to
Protect the National Security Interest
The government's ability to suppress information depends upon a balance
between its particular government interest and the public interest in free
speech. Both of these interests should be apparent in an SBU information
control system. Definitions should be not only precise, but narrow, imposing
secrecy only on the class of SBU information that poses a significant national
security danger. The means of enforcing the secrecy interest should also be
the least restrictive necessary to fulfill the government's legitimate interests.
In particular, an SBU information control system incorporates the public
interest in the free flow of information when it employs the mechanism of
prepublication review selectively and sparingly in circumstances where less
onerous means of control, such as nondisclosure pledges or requirements of
prepublication review and comment, as opposed to approval, cannot protect
the government' s national security interest.
CONCLUSION

The government's purpose in imposing the current SBU secrecy clauses
on private scientists undertaking funded research is legitimate and perhaps
even compelling. It seeks to protect the national security by ensuring that our
enemies do not have access to information that might help them to harm us.
But purpose alone does not demonstrate the constitutionality of a government
action. The mechanism by which the government achieves its secrecy
purpose must be crafted to serve the government interest without
unnecessarily undermining free speech. General free speech principles, as
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well as those addressed specifically to secrecy clauses and speech-limiting
conditions on government programs, indicate that the current SBU secrecy
clause intrudes too far on the free speech right. Its problematic features are
its imprecise definitions, its authorization of enforcement by prepublication
review, and the fact that it is not part of a system that links protected
information to a clear national security danger.
The government's constitutional authority to prevent the release of SBU
information in private expression is, therefore, uncertain. Yet recent changes
in the security environment may permit the government to impose secrecy
requirements on some amount of "sensitive" information, even though it is
not contained within the formal classification system. A balance of the
government's national security interest with the free speech right must
determine the extent of this protection. At a minimum, a constitutional
system to protect SBU information must include features that resemble those
of the classification system that are designed to protect the free speech right.
These include precise definitions of types of SBU information tied to a
definite national security interest, procedures to ensure that particular
information is properly categorized and kept secret, and selective and limited
use of prepublication review. These features provide the beginning of what
must be an ongoing adjustment in the balance between secrecy and openness
with respect to government funded scientific research.

